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INTRODUCTION
Mandatory disclosure has been at the core of U.S. securities
regulation since its adoption in the early 1930s. For many decades, this
fixture of our financial system was accepted with little examination.
Over the last twenty years, however, mandatory disclosure has been
subject to intensifying intellectual crosscurrents. Some commentators
hold out the U.S. system as the standard for the world. They argue
that adoption by other countries of a U.S.-styled system, with its
greater corporate transparency, would enhance their economic
performance.1 Other commentators, in contrast, insist that the U.S.
mandatory disclosure regime represents a mistake, not a model.2
These crosscurrents are reflected as well in the actions and words of
policymakers. On the one hand, Congress, responding to the recent
spate of corporate scandals, enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,3 which
amended the U.S. securities laws to require what is probably the
greatest increase in disclosure since their inception. On the other
hand, the Council of Economic Advisors, in its discussion of these
reforms in the 2003 Economic Report of the President, agnostically
stated that "whether SEC-enforced disclosure rules actually improve
the quality of information that investors receive remains a subject of
debate among researchers almost 70 years after the SEC's creation."4
Most debate between these contending positions has been at the
level of theory.5 The surprisingly small amount of empirical research
brought to bear on the issues involved is relatively equivocal in its
implications.6 This Article introduces to the legal debate important
1. See, e.g. , Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 787 (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as
History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its
Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1999); James D . Cox, Symposium: Regulatory Duopoly
in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200 { 1999).
2. See, e.g., George Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973); Stephen J. Choi &
Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 907 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency
Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 909, 928 (1994); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) [hereinafter Romano, Empowering
Investors]; George Stigler, Public Regulation ofthe Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964).
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
4. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 95-97 (2003).
5. See infra Part I.
6. Two prominent financial accounting commentators recently stated, "Whether there is a
market failure for disclosure and whether it is corrected through regulation are empirical
questions. However, empirical research on these questions is virtually non-existent." Paul M. Healy
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new empirical evidence based on recent research of the authors and
others that, while not definitively settling the overall question of
mandatory disclosure's desirability, helps resolve two central, highly
disputed questions:
- Is the efficiency of the real economy (the actual production
of goods and services) enhanced when share prices become
more accurate?
- Do rules mandating that issuers make public disclosures
actually increase share price accuracy?7
Contrary to the arguments advanced by opponents of mandatory
disclosure, the empirical evidence presented here suggests that both of
these questions should be answered in the affirmative.
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the debate in the existing legal
literature concerning these two questions. Part II sets out the basic
concepts needed to understand the new empirical evidence: the ideas
of share price accuracy and share price informedness, and the
relatively new technique called the R2 methodology, which we use to
measure share price accuracy. Part III discusses studies utilizing the R2
methodology recently published in the finance literature by authors of
this Article and others, which strongly suggest that greater share price
accuracy does lead to enhanced efficiency in the real economy. Part
IV presents the results of a new study that we have conducted utilizing
the R2 methodology that suggest that mandatory disclosure does in fact
increase the amount of meaningful information reflected in share
prices. The study examines the effects of the change in disclosure
rules, adopted in December 1980, that enhanced the requirements
concerning management discussion and analysis of issuer financial
condition and operating results (the "MD&A" requirements). This
& Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A
Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 405, 412 (2001) (emphasis

added).
The empirical literature that does exist primarily addresses the initial impact of the
imposition of the U.S. mandatory disclosure securities laws in the 1930s. For a critical review
of the existing empirical literature, see Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563, 602-07 (2001) [hereinafter Fox, Issuer Choice]; Merritt B.
Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85
VA. L. REV. 1334, 1369-95 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure].

7. The question of the link between mandatory disclosure and share price accuracy
subsumes two more specific operational questions. One is whether mandatory disclosure
rules succeed in promoting an increase in meaningful public disclosure. The other is whether
issuer public disclosure plays an important role in enhancing share price accuracy, or
whether the other routes by which information is gathered, analyzed and acted upon (insider
trading, selective disclosure, independent research by analysts, etc.) predominate in the
setting of share prices. Opponents to mandatory disclosure raise both of these more specific
operational questions. See infra Part LC. An affirmative answer to the larger question of the
link between mandatory disclosure and share price accuracy would imply an affirmative
answer to both of these more specific operational questions as well. A negative answer to the
larger question would suggest a negative answer to one or both of the two more specific
operational questions.
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change for the first time effectively requires managers to disclose any
material information that suggests that the issuer's most recent results
are not necessarily indicative of future operating results or future
financial condition. Our study suggests that share prices did in fact
become more informed as a result of the enhanced MD&A
requirements.
I.
A.

THE EXISTING LE GAL DEBATE

The Traditional Consensus and Its Collapse

For the first three decades following passage of the Securities Act
of 1933 ("Securities Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act"), most securities law commentators took the
desirability of mandatory disclosure as a given. These commentators
believed that the primary purpose of the securities laws is to promote
faimess.8 In their view, price accuracy promotes fairness because it is
unfair for a purchaser to pay more for a share than it is really worth.
To them, mandatory disclosure is beneficial because it clarifies the
value of the share and therefore makes such unfair overpayment less
likely.9
This consensus began to break down as discussion of securities law
started to be infused with financial economics. Financial economics
suggests that disclosure is not necessary to protect investors against
unfair prices. The efficient market hypothesis ("EMH")10 holds that
the price of a thickly traded stock is unbiased - i.e., on average equal
to the stock's actual value11 - and this is true whether there is a great
deal of information available about the issuer or only a little.12 Thus, a
law requiring issuers to disclose more information than they would
otherwise voluntarily disclose is unnecessary to protect ordinary

8. See John A. C. Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 WIS. L.
REV. 720; Homer Kripke, Manne's Insider Trading Thesis and Other Failures of
Conservative Economics, 4 CATO J. 945 (1985); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A
Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV.1425 (1967).
9. Mandatory periodic disclosure would also make less likely the reciprocal unfairness
where an investor sells a share in the secondary market for less than it is worth.
10. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
11. The term "actual value" is discussed infra in Part II.A.I.
12. This conclusion stems from empirical work showing unbiased reactions to
announcements of corporate information, see infra note 41, and from the proposition that
there is no reason to believe that the market will not also be unbiased in its reactions to
issuer absences of comment about certain matters. For a more complete discussion of this
point with citations to the literature, as well as consideration of why the noise-theory critique
of the EMH does not undermine this argument in ways that create a strong fairness
argument for mandatory disclosure, see Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2533-39 (1997)
[hereinafter Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market].
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investors from buying shares at prices that are unfair in the sense of
being on average greater than their actual values.13
Attention thus shifted from the effects of mandatory disclosure on
fairness to its effects on economic efficiency. Here opinions among
financial economists have varied.14 Mandatory disclosure's effect on
efficiency has also been a matter of intense debate among the
economics-oriented members of the legal academy. As the discussion
below indicates, the two questions this Article addresses empirically
- whether an increase in share price accuracy enhances the

13. This ex ante approach to the question of price fairness is, in our view. the
appropriate one. The focus is on the point in time at which the investor purchases her share.
This is the point at which the investor makes the decision that puts her in a position to be
affected by the future disclosure practices of the issuer. There is a broad consensus that the
effect of these future disclosure practices on the expected future cash flow to holders of the
issuer's shares is reflected in the price. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 2, at 925; Fox,
Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 12, at 2533-39; Romano, Empowering
Investors, supra note 2, at 2366-67. From the perspective of the shareholder at the time of
purchase, the fact that share price is unbiased regardless of the issuer's disclosure practices
means that the possibility that the investor will end up ex post worse off as a result of the
issuer's disclosure practices by paying too much for the share is no greater than the
possibility that she will end up better off ex post by paying too little as a result of these
practices. It may be that an issuer's disclosure level affects the riskiness of the purchase, but
which way is a complex question discussed infra in Part II. Moreover, even if for the time
horizon relevant to the investor the effect of low disclosure is to increase the riskiness of the
purchase, it would not be appropriate to label that effect "unfair." Since issuer disclosure
relates only to revelation of firm-specific information (as opposed to information relevant to
the returns on all issuers in the market), the risk here is unsystematic and can be diversified
away. This means that it is not even clear that most investors incur any additional risk from a
low level of issuer disclosure, at least over the longer run. Most investors are at least
somewhat diversified. See Marshall E. Blume & Irwin Friend, The Asset Structure of
Individual Portfolios and Some Implications for Utility Functions, 30 J. FIN . 585, 585-87
(1975) (indicating that, while investors are not as diversified as is often assumed in the
literature, most investors appear to be at least somewhat diversified). Moreover, casual
empiricism suggests that many investors are buying and selling in the market over a
considerable portion of their lifetime. Their ex post losses from paying too much for some
shares should therefore approximately average out to their ex post gains from paying too
little for others. As for helping investors who are not diversified, it is probably better public
policy to engage in an educational campaign urging them to start diversifying than to
mandate a costly disclosure rule that at best can only protect those who choose not to
diversify their holdings.
14. The opening attack on the proposition that there were efficiency benefits from
mandatory disclosure came in the 1960s in the form of empirical work by economists
studying the effects of the imposition of the U.S. mandatory disclosure laws in the 1 930s. See,
e.g. , Benston, supra note 2, at 132; Stigler, supra note 2, at 1 22-24. For a more detailed
discussion of this work and the work of other economists who come to opposing conclusions,
see Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 6, at 1369-95. Signaling theory - the
idea that issuers with good news will want to disclose it and that the market will infer from
the silence of the rest that they do not have good news - added a theoretical component to
this case against mandatory disclosure. See Steven A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in
Financial Markets: Implications of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES

177 (Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979). For a critical review of
signaling theory with citations to the literature, see Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure,
supra note 6, at 1369-95; see also infra note 37 and accompanying text.
IN FINANCIAL REGULATION
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performance of the real economy and whether mandatory disclosure
increases share price accuracy- are at the center of this debate.'5
B.

Share Price A ccuracy and Economic Efficiency

Do more accurate share prices enhance economic efficiency? Some
legal scholars think not and embrace what we call the "irrelevance
position." Others think the level of share price accuracy is relevant to
economic efficiency.
1.

The Irrelevance Position

Some scholars embrace the irrelevance position based on a simple
application of first principles derived from the widely accepted
theories forming the foundations of the capital asset pricing model
("CAPM") and the EMH. These commentators believe that these
principles can be used to demonstrate the impossibility of more
informed prices enhancing efficiency.16 The view of these theoretical
skeptics, including Professors Barbara Banoff and Roberta Romano,
starts with the proposition that the EMH assures that prices will be
unbiased and hence fair. They then go on to argue that any
improvements in share price accuracy resulting from increased
disclosure affect only firm-specific risk, which can be diversified away.
Under CAPM, a change in the level of firm-specific risk has no effect
on the market value of its shares. This is because a security with higher
firm-specific risk will not be priced in the market to produce a higher
expected return since there is no need to provide an extra reward to
induce the holding of risks that can be ·diversified away. These scholars
15. As noted, the empirical findings presented here suggest, contrary to the positions of
opponents of mandatory disclosure, that more accurate share prices enhance the
performance of the real economy and that mandatory disclosure increases share price
accuracy. A third question remains, however, before the question of the desirability of
mandatory disclosure can be resolved definitively: are the benefits to the real economy as
great as the costs of mandatory disclosure?
Affirmative empirical evidence is lacking for the proposition that the benefits are
greater than the costs. Affirmative evidence is similarly lacking, however, for the proposition
that the costs are greater than the benefits. This void is going to be difficult to fill. Given the
amount of background noise and the limited power of the statistical tests currently available
to test these propositions, mandatory disclosure would have to have an extraordinarily large
positive or negative net effect on social welfare for the effect to be detected at a statistically
significant level. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 6, at 1383-90. Thus, for
now at least, the answer to this third question is probably going to have to be decided on the
basis of theory.
16. Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration:
VA. L. REV. 135, 176-84 (1984) (claiming that improvements in
share price accuracy resulting from the underwriter due diligence prompted by the due
diligence liability defense in Section ll(b) of the 1933 Act are not worthwhile); Roberta
Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 387, 482 (2001) [hereinafter Romano, Need for Competition].
An Analysis of Rule 415, 70
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thus believe that any improvement in share price accuracy that
mandatory disclosure may bring about cannot justify its cost, since
improved share price accuracy will not increase the market value of
the shares involved. As a result, they oppose mandatory disclosure.
Other scholars embracing the irrelevance position, including
Professor Lynn Stout, acknowledge the theoretical argument that
share price accuracy could enhance economic efficiency by helping to
better guide capital to the most promising proposed investment
projects, but dismiss the importance of this effect in the real world.17
These writers point to the institutional reality that the vast majority of
new real investment is not funded by public offerings of equity. These
institutional skeptics believe, therefore, that share prices can have at
most only a small effect on the functioning of the real economy.18 As a
result, they believe in the inherent weakness of any argument that
favors mandatory disclosure based on the real economy efficiency
effects of improved share price accuracy.
2.

The Relevance Position

The adherents of the relevance position, among whom we include
ourselves, believe that the effects of share price accuracy on economic
efficiency are much more important than do either the theoretical or
institutional skeptics. 19 The theoretical skeptics seem to take as a given
the cash flows generated by firms, with equity ownership simply
representing a method for investors to store wealth and the stock
market simply providing a facility for the trading of financial assets,
hedging, diversification, and pooling of risk. In contrast, the relevance
adherents see the prices established in the stock market as affecting
the efficiency of the real economy.20 More accurate prices can increase
17. Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of
Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 645-47 (1988); see also
HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 135-39 (1979); Adolf A. Berle,
Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 445-47 (1962).
18. The term "real economy" refers to the production of goods and services in ways that
provide for present and future consumption. The term "real investment" means investment,
such as buildings, machinery, or research and development, that enhances the capacity of the
economy to produce goods and services. Both real economy and real investment are
distinguished from finance, which relates to the allocation of future cash flows and their
associated risks.
19. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 751 (1984) [hereinafter Coffee, Market Failure]; Fox,
Disclosure in a G/oba/izing Market, supra note 12; Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration,
Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1005, 1015-25 (1984); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of
"Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977 (1992); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure
as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995).
20. In ignoring disclosure's effects on the real economy, the theoretical skeptics follow
the bulk of theoretical literature in the area of economics of disclosure. Most of this
literature focuses on the effects of disclosure on the efficiency with which securities are
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the amount of value added by firms as they use society's scarce
resources for the production of goods and services. In a competitive
economy, this increase in value added will generally increase both the
level of firm cash flows, which the theoretical skeptics take as given,
and returns to other factors of production.21 Greater disclosure and
share price accuracy perform this function both by improving the
quality of choice among proposed investment projects in the economy
and by improving the operation of existing real assets.
As the relevance adherents see it, improved price accuracy in the
primary market for shares produces these social benefits directly.
Greater share price accuracy at a time when an issuer contemplates
implementing a new project by means of a share offering will bring the
issuer's cost of capital more in line with the social cost of investing
society's scarce savings in the contemplated project. As a result, these
savings are allocated more efficiently, going more to the most
promising proposed projects in the economy.22
Improved price accuracy in the secondary market, and the
disclosure that induces it, create social benefits as well, though less
directly. Disclosure and more accurate secondary market share prices
enhance the effectiveness of the social devices that limit the extent to
which managers of public corporations place their own interests above
those of their shareholders (the agency costs of management). To
start, additional disclosure and increased share price accuracy, by
signaling when there are problems, assist in both the effective exercise
of the shareholder franchise and shareholder enforcement of

exchanged in the market. The fact that this is the focus of most disclosure economists might
appear to give the position of the theoretical skeptics a certain authority, but, in this case,
appearances are deceiving. In a comprehensive survey article concerning this literature,
Robert Verrecchia sees the focus on the efficiency with which securities are exchanged as
reflecting a desire by disclosure economists to take on an intellectual challenge: to show,
contrary to the earliest articles in the field, that disclosure can promote efficiency even in a
pure exchange economy. Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON.
97, 160-164 (2001). Verrecchia states:
Researchers had long recognized that production militates against all potential debilitating
effects of disclosure, including adverse risk sharing. Consequently, the path that promoted
disclosure as a device to yield social value in production and exchange economies was
deemed insufficiently provocative. Alternatively, paths that promoted a utility for disclosure
in (exclusively) pure exchange settings remained popular because they appeared to be
addressing the "disclosure paradox": that is, explaining why it was not the case that more
disclosure was bad, and not good.
Id. at 163 (footnotes omitted); see also J. Gregory Kunkel, Sufficient Conditions for Public
Information to Have Social Value in a Production Economy, 37 J. FIN. 1005 (1982)

(maintaining that the problem with the early literature showing that disclosure reduced
efficiency is that it focused solely on the exchange of securities and did not account for the
disclosure's beneficial effects on the allocation of real resources in the economy).

21.
22.

See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 12, at 2561-69.
See Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 6, at

1358-63.
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management's fiduciary duties.23 Additional disclosure and more
accurate share prices also increase the threat of hostile takeover when
managers engage in non-share-value-maximizing behavior. They make
a takeover less risky for potential acquirers and reduce the chance that
a value-enhancing acquisition will be deterred by the target having an
inaccurately high share price.24
The institutional skeptics accept as a theoretical matter the portion
of this story concerning the role of accurate share prices in improving
capital allocation when issuers offer new shares.25 As noted above,
however, they dismiss the importance of this phenomenon because of
the relatively small percentage of all capital projects that are funded
by new issues of shares.26 There are two responses to this. First, the
institutional skeptics ignore the role that ongoing disclosure and
improved price accuracy in secondary trading markets play in the
reduction of the agency costs of management. The reduction in agency
costs not only improves how existing projects are operated; it also
improves capital allocations because misuse of most firms' primary
source of capital funds - internal cash flow - is probably the single
greatest agency cost of management.27

23. See Merritt B . Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, LA w &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1999, at 113. This is obvious when disclosures themselves
suggest the possible existence of such a problem. Signaling also can occur when a share price
declines, indicating, if the price has a relatively high level of accuracy, that something is
amiss.
24. The market for corporate control is a well-recognized device for limiting the agency
costs of management where ownership is separated from control, as in the typical publicly
held corporation. More information and the resulting increase in price accuracy improves
the control market's effectiveness in performing this role. A potential acquirer, in deciding
whether it is worth the price to acquire a target that the acquirer feels is mismanaged, must
make an assessment of what the target would be worth in the acquirer's hands. This
assessment is inherently risky and acquirer management is likely to be risk averse. Greater
disclosure, however, reduces the riskiness of this assessment. Hence, with greater disclosure,
a smaller apparent deviation between incumbent management decisionmaking and what
would maximize share value is needed to impel a potential acquirer into action.
Additionally, when share price is inaccurately high, even a potential acquirer who is
certain that it can run the target better than can the incumbent management may find the
target not worth the cost of acquisition. The increase in share price accuracy that results
from greater disclosure reduces the chance that a socially worthwhile takeover will be
thwarted in this fashion.
Greater disclosure thus makes the hostile takeover threat more real. Incumbent
managers will be less tempted to implement negative net present value projects in order to
maintain or enlarge their empires, or to operate existing projects in ways that sacrifice
profits to satisfy their personal aims. Those that nevertheless act in this manner are more
likely to be replaced. See MERRITT B. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A
DYNAMIC ECONOMY 84-91 (1987).
25. Stout, supra note 17, at 643.
26. Id. at 645-47.
27. FOX, supra note 24, at 121-50; Michael C. Jensen, The Agency Costs of Free Cash
Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).
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Second, more accurate share prices in the secondary market also
improve capital allocation when the firm uses nonequity external
sources of capital such as debt offerings or institutional borrowings.
On the supply side, share price can affect the financial cost of a
proposed investment project by affecting the terms at which
intermediaries are willing to extend the firm these alternative forms of
external financing.28 On the demand side, share price can affect
management's willingness to use funds to implement a new project.
Share price can affect management's willingness to use debt financing
because of the prospect that the firm will subsequently want to
counterbalance any new debt with new equity financing in order to
maintain its optimal debt/equity ratio.29 More generally, because of
concern with public perceptions, low share price can constrain use of
both external and internal funds.30 Putting these supply and demand
factors together, if share price is inaccurately low, management may
decide not to pursue relatively promising proposed investment
projects, while if it is inaccurately high, management may implement
relatively unpromising proposed proj ects. Greater share price
accuracy limits this problem.
3.

Empirical Studies

These contending views are based primarily on theory. Until now,
there has been little empirical evidence brought to bear on the
question of whether more accurate share prices do or do not in fact
significantly enhance the efficiency of the real economy.
C.

Mandatory Disclosure and Share Price A ccuracy

Does mandatory disclosure enhance share price accuracy? Some
legal scholars who oppose mandatory disclosure believe not. Legal
scholars who favor mandatory disclosure inherently believe that it
does.

28. KRIPKE, supra note 17, at 123.
29. Some financial theorists suggest that there is no optimal debt/equity ratio. For the
classic statement of this view, see Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of
Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
The more orthodox view today is, however, that there are factors weighing against both too
little debt and too much. Too little debt deprives a firm of its tax-deductible interest
payments. Too much debt leads to increased agency costs because of the resulting increased
divergence between the interests of debt and equity. It also increases the likelihood of
bankruptcy, which would involve real costs. For an overview of these points and the
responses of the adherents of financial structure irrelevance, see RICHARD A. BREALEY &
STEWART C. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 447-66 (5th ed. 1996).
30. See Fox, supra note 24, at 282-87.
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The Ineffectiveness Position

Scholars such as Professors Jonathan Macey, Roberta Romano,
Homer Kripke and Ed Kitch maintain that mandatory disclosure is
relatively ineffective. They believe that most information gets
incorporated into share prices via other routes - including voluntary
public disclosure by issuers, selective disclosure by issuers to analysts
and major investors, insider trading, and independent research by
analysts and the news media.J1
The skepticism of these scholars concerning the effectiveness of
mandatory disclosure comes in substantial part from the belief that,
compared to the incentives of the private actors involved in these
other routes, "monopolist" government bureaucrats do not have
adequate incentives to ask the right questions.J2 The result, the
argument runs, has been an undue emphasis on historical data, which
is of much less value in moving share price toward actual value than
would be management's projections of future cash flows.JJ Moreover,
the ineffectiveness adherents suggest that most responses to the
government-mandated questions are. either banal boilerplate or have
already been revealed voluntarily prior to their appearance in SEC
filings.J4 In addition, at least one such adherent, Ed Kitch, maintains
that where the government does ask questions that are both of real
relevance and the answers to which would not have been produced
voluntarily, the proper response would typically involve the release of
proprietary information.J5 In these situations, Kitch argues, issuers
figure out how to avoid giving meaningful answers.J6
2.

The Effectiveness Position

Legal scholars who favor mandatory disclosure generally argue
that, in the absence of regulation, the existence of externalities will
result in a market failure whereby too little information will be

31. Macey, supra note 2, at 928; Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 2, at 237380; Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 16, at 446-64.
32. Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 2, at 2374, 2378-80. Some economists
share this view. See Ross L. WATTS & JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, POSITIVE ACCOUNTING
THEORY 173-76 (1986) (stating that disclosure regulators act to maximize their own
interests).
33. Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 151, 1 197-1201 (1970).
34. Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 16, at 458.
35. Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 763, 846-57 (1995).
36. Id.

December 2003]

Share Price Accuracy

343

incorporated into share prices.37 Implicit in this position is the belief
that mandatory disclosure results in meaningful issuer disclosures that
would otherwise not be forthcoming and that these disclosures add to
share price accuracy.
The ineffectiveness adherents' complaint concerning mandated
disclosure's emphasis on historical data, rather than on management
projections, has a "glass is half empty" quality. While access to
management's particular view of the future is useful, no one management or outsider - can predict the future except on the basis
of facts concerning the world past and present. SEC-mandated
historical data provides significant raw material for this kind of
analysis. The complaint that much SEC-induced disclosure appears to
be boilerplate overlooks the important information that is revealed by
a minority of issuers when answering the same questions that result in
banal, boilerplate answers by the majority of issuers. The minority is
prompted to provide significant detail because for them, unlike for the
majority, a banal answer alone would be misleading without more
disclosure.38 As to the ineffectiveness adherents' complaint that much
of what does appear to be significant in SEC-induced disclosures has
been previously revealed to the public voluntarily by issuers, the
effectiveness adherents reply that these earlier "voluntary" disclosures
may well have occurred only because the issuer knew that it would be
required to reveal the information in an SEC filing anyway and
decided that it might as well get credit for disclosing the information
sooner.39 Furthermore, without this SEC requirement, the earlier
announcement, if it occurred at all, might well not have been as full or
as accurate.
These rebuttals to the arguments of the ineffectiveness adherents
have merit. We nevertheless recognize that behind this debate among
37. See, e.g. , Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1490-91 (1992); Coffee,
Market Failure, supra note 19; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory
Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673-77 (1984); Fox, Issuer
Choice, supra note 6, at 569-98; Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 6, at 1346.

Many economics of disclosure theorists use models in which management discloses less
because of concerns that disclosure can hurt their firms' competitive positions. For surveys
of these models, see Verrecchia, supra note 20, at 141-60, and Healy & Palepu, supra note 6,
at 424-25. There is some empirical evidence supporting this theoretical proposition. Joseph
Piotroski finds that a firm is more likely to add financial reporting about one of its individual
business segments where it has declining profitability (a condition suggesting that the issuer
will suffer less from competitors and potential competitors learning of the issuer's segment
profits) or less variability in profitability among its business segments (a condition suggesting
that providing only company-wide financial reporting obscures less so that the competitive
harm from providing segment reporting is less). Joseph David Piotroski, The Impact of
Discretionary Segment Reporting Behavior on Investor Beliefs and Stock Prices 5-47 (1999)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with author).
38. Fox, Issuer Choice, supra note 6, at 594.
39. Id. at 595.
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legal scholars, there is a complex theoretical debate in economics
concerning the contribution, if any, of mandatory disclosure to
enhancing share price accuracy. The literature constituting this
theoretical debate, discussed briefly below,40 focuses on the economic
incentives to gather, share, and trade on information in a world where
there is also, depending on the particular study, voluntary public
disclosure, selective disclosure by issuers to analysts and major
investors, insider trading, or independent research by analysts and
news media. To us, the contradictory conclusions of the different
theoretical studies concerning the effectiveness of public disclosure in
general, or mandatory public disclosure in particular, often seem to be
artifacts of the particular assumptions that the authors of the
respective studies employ. Ultimately, the issue of the effectiveness of
mandatory disclosure is one that can only be settled empirically. The
study set out in Part IV concerning the enhanced MD&A
requirements is a contribution to this empirical effort and suggests
that mandatory disclosure can effectively enhance share price
accuracy.
II.

SHARE PRICE ACCURACY, SHARE PRICE INFORMEDNESS, AND
THE R2 METHODOLOGY

Before we can talk about whether more accurate share prices lead
to greater economic efficiency and whether mandatory disclosure
leads to more accurate share prices, we need to discuss with greater
precision what it means to say that prices are more accurate. We then
need to relate the concept of share price accuracy, which is the term
that has traditionally been used in the debate concerning the
relationship between the quality of share prices and economic
efficiency, to the closely related, newer concept of share price
informedness. We also need to discuss R2 , our empirical measure of
share price accuracy.
A. Share Price Accuracy
The concept of share price accuracy relates to how good a share's
price is as a predictor of the future cash flows (dividends and any other
distributions) that will be received by whoever holds the share over
the rest of the life of the issuing firm. The roles that share prices can
play in the functioning of the real economy relate to their capacity to
signal which firms' proposed investment projects promise the highest
returns and which firms' managers are doing a good job at operating

40. See infra Part Il.A.2.b.
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existing facilities. The better share prices predict future firm cash
flows, the better they perform these roles.
1.

Precise Definitions of "Actual Value" and "Share Price Accuracy"

The first step in understanding share price accuracy is to define a
share's "actual value," which at any point in time is the aggregate
future stream of income - dividends and other distributions - paid
out from then on to whoever holds the share over the lifetime of the
firm (discounted to present value). This definition requires an ex post
view to be operative. The actual value of a share at t0, a point during
the ongoing life of the firm, cannot be determined until the moment of
the firm's liquidation, t,iq' The moment of liquidation is the end of the
firm's life, by which time the issuer has paid out its last distribution.
Until t,iq• the amounts, if any, of the remaining distribution or
distributions are uncertain. Thus, at t0, which is prior to t,iq• even the
best informed real-world investor can only make an estimate of the
share's actual value.
What can we say about the relationship at t0 between the market
price of a publicly traded share and its actual value? As noted earlier,
the EMH suggests that the market price of a share at t0 is an unbiased
estimate of the share's actual value at t0•41 In other words, the price at
t0 is equally likely to ultimately turn out to have been below the
share's actual value at t0 as it is to have been above it. By itself,
however, the conclusion that a share price is unbiased says nothing
about how close the price is likely to be - one way or the other - to
actual value. Share price is relatively "accurate" if it is likely to be
relatively close, whether above or below, to the share's actual value.42

41. There is a large body of financial economics literature evaluating market reactions
to affirmative public announcements of various kinds of events affecting particular issuers.
For a classic review, see KENNETH GARBADE, SECURITIES MARKETS 249-59 (1982). An
"event study" involves a large number of issuers, each of which has experienced at one time
or another the announcement of a particular kind of event, for example a stock split. The
typical study shows that the shares of the affected firms as a group experience statistically
significant abnormal returns at the time of the announcement, and, starting almost
immediately thereafter, normal returns for the duration of the study, which is sometimes as
long as several years. Thus, while some issuers' share prices go up in the periods following
the immediate reaction to the announcement and others go down (each compared with the
market as a whole), the average change is near zero. Assuming that longer-term prices are
themselves unbiased measures of actual value, the results of the studies are thus consistent
with the concept that the market's evaluation of the significance of the event on the actual
value of each issuer's shares, while it may sometimes have been too high and sometimes too
low, was unbiased.
42. Put in statistical terms, price can be considered a random variable generated by a
distribution function that, because price is unbiased, has a mean equal to the share's actual
value and a variance that can be considered a measure of the expected accuracy of the price.
Throughout this article, when we refer to price accuracy, we are referring to this concept of
expected price accuracy.
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When a price has a high expected accuracy, the deviation of the price
from actual value is, on average, relatively small.
2.

The Core Determinants of Share Price Accuracy: The Existence of
Information and Its Reflection in Price

Share price accuracy is a function of two core determinants. One is
the amount of information concerning a firm's future distributions that
exists in the hands of one or more persons in the world. The other is
the extent to which price reflects this information. A number of
considerations influence these two core determinants of share price
accuracy.
a. L ength of time before liquidation. The closer in time an issuer is
to its liquidation, the more accurate, everything else being equal, is its
share price. This proposition becomes obvious by looking at an
issuer's share price when the issuer is taking its last breaths
immediately prior to liquidation (i.e., when t0 is at a moment
immediately prior to t1iq). The market price is likely to be very close to
the amount of the liquidating distribution paid to the holder of each of
its shares (whether zero or some positive amount). This is because of
the way both determinants of share price accuracy work at this point.
As for the amount of information, it is relatively easy for at least some
people to be highly informed concerning the size of the final
distribution. This information is then very likely to become fully, or
nearly fully, reflected in price, either through public disclosure of what
the liquidating distribution will be, or, unless prevented by effective
rules imposed by the legal system or norm structure applicable to the
holders of the information, through trading by insiders or others
informed via tipping or selective disclosure.43
b. Economic and legal incentives to gather, share, and trade on
information and their interaction. When a possible cash distribution by
an issuer to its shareholders is further in the future, share price
accuracy is affected by the fact that it inherently becomes increasingly
difficult for persons to gather and analyze information about the
factors determining the amount of the distribution. How much
information is in fact gathered and analyzed by anyone depends both
on the economic incentives to do so, and, to the extent they exist, on
laws that effectively require such collection and analysis (such as a rule
requiring a public company to undergo an audit certified by an
independent accountant). The extent to which such information is
then reflected in price depends on the economic and legal incentives,
43. Because the information provides a near-certain prediction of the amount of the
distribution, the economic risk associated with trading on the information is very low.
Absent effective legal or normative restraints on such trading, the volume of trades by
insiders, tipees, and selective disclosure recipients is therefore likely to be high.
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both positive and negative, for persons who have gathered and
analyzed such information to disclose it to others (publicly or
selectively). It also depends on the economic and legal incentives, both
positive and negative, of anyone possessing such information
whether a generator or a receiver- to trade on it.
Assessing the effect of existing economic and legal incentives on
price accuracy is made more complex by the fact that there is an
interaction between the considerations determining how much
information is gathered and analyzed and the considerations
determining how much of what is gathered and analyzed gets reflected
in price. On the one hand, the opportunity to trade on information
that is not required to be disclosed to others creates incentives to
gather and analyze such information. On the other hand, the more
widely held information is by persons who can trade on it, the more
likely it is to be reflected in price.44 Moreover, when someone receives,
whether by selective or public disclosure, information gathered by
someone else, the recipient may find it more worthwhile herself to
gather and analyze yet additional information. This is because the
information that is received may constitute a valuable input to the
process of further discovery. Thus, for example, it may be more
worthwhile for an investor to gather and analyze information (not yet
gathered and analyzed by others) concerning the market for the
product of an issuer that has disclosed basic financial information
about itself, than to gather and analyze information concerning the
market for the product of a firm that has not engaged in such

44. See Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Sept.-Oct. 1965, at 55 (describing how information is incorporated into price); Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549,
568-69 (1984). The simplest models of price formation suggest that price is the product of the
weighted average of expectations of all investors. See, e.g., John Lintner, The Aggregation of
Investor's Diverse Judgments and Preferences in a Purely Competitive Economy, 4 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 347, 348 (1969). This would mean that the trading of a small
number of arbitrageurs acting on a piece of information could not by itself move price
sufficiently to fully reflect the import of the piece of information. Indeed, contrary to the
EMH, in such a model, the price would not fully reflect the information until all active
investors knew the information. Fox, supra note 24, at 36-43 (demonstrating the inadequacy
of arbitrage to fully correct prices due to the risk that purchases or short sales of arbitraged
shares add to an arbitrageur's portfolio because of the dediversification they involve). More
sophisticated models recognize that investors are aware that price may reflect information
known by other investors. Hence price is not just a constraint, it can affect investors' demand
for securities and, as a result, information known by only some traders can influence price as
if more investors knew it. Sanford Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock
Markets Where Investors Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573, 573-74 (1976). This is not
a complete substitute for broader distribution of the information, however, because the
existence of noise - other things affecting price - makes it impossible for investors not
possessing the information to "decode" share price so effectively that they are in the same
position as if they knew the information themselves. Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E .
Stiglitz, O n the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 7 0 A M . ECON. REV. 393,
394-95 (1980).
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disclosure.45 In addition, when a small number of people are able to
trade regularly on relatively precise material information, it becomes
less profitable for persons outside that circle to gather and analyze
information for trading purposes.46 The complexities of these
interactions are what make it difficult to determine at a theoretical
level whether share price accuracy is enhanced or diminished by any
of the standard tools of securities regulation such as insider trading
regulation, the regulation of selective disclosure, or - our concern
here - mandatory disclosure.
3.

"Speculative Noise" Versus "Fundamental Information"

Share price accuracy will be diminished if the price is affected by
what financial economists refer to as "speculative noise." The model
of share pricing described so far excludes this kind of noise. It assumes
that whatever information share prices do reflect, it is of a kind that
will help in predicting future distributions more precisely, i.e., it is
"fundamental information. " Thus the model implicitly assumes that
the arbitrage activities of "smart money" speculators, who focus
exclusively on future distributions, fully counteract any trading by
"nai've" speculators, whose trading is activated by fads, fashions, or
45. There are good theoretical reasons for thinking this to be true. The discovery of
information not yet discovered by others and hence not reflected in market price is likely to
hold the promise of greater arbitrage profits in the case of a firm that has disclosed basic
financial information about itself than in the case of one that has not. The firm that has not
disclosed the basic financial information is likely to have, for the relevant time period, more
risk associated with it than does the firm that has disclosed this information. The risk is firm
specific, though, and so it will not affect the riskiness of a fully diversified portfolio. Each
purchase, based on the difference between current price and what is indicated by the newly
discovered information, is, however, an inherently dediverisfying transaction. Taking on an
additional share of the firm that has not disclosed will add more to the riskiness of the
investor's portfolio than taking on an additional share of the issuer that has disclosed. Thus,
compared with the firm that has disclosed, fewer shares of the firm that has not disclosed will
be added to the investor's portfolio before the additional arbitrage gain from purchasing an
additional share is not worth the added risk. See Fox, supra note 24, at 36-43. This prospect
of smaller arbitrage profits will reduce the incentive to gather and analyze information about
the firm that does not disclose. More generally, John Coffee has made the argument that
mandatory disclosure constitutes a subsidy to the investment-analyst industry that increases
the amount of analyst activity. Coffee, supra note 19, at 728-29. Coffee's point is consistent
with the theoretical point made by Grossman and Stiglitz that if the cost of gathering and
analyzing private information is lower (which it would be with more free, publicly available
information to use as feedstock for research) there will be a higher intensity of trading by the
smart money speculators, which will lead to more informed prices. Grossman & Stiglitz,
supra note 44, at 405. There is some empirical support for the theory that more disclosure
leads to more gathering and analysis of yet additional information. Lang and Lundholm find
that a firm that discloses more is followed by more analysts and that the analysts' forecasts
are more accurate. Mark Lang & Russell Lundholm, Cross Sectional Determinants of
Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosure, 31 J. ACCT. RES. 246 (1993).
46. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and the Efficiency of
Stock Prices, 23 RAND J. ECON. 106, 1 10 (1992); Zahar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky,
On Insider Trading, Markets, and "Negative" Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV.
1229, 1238-43 (2001).
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irrational psychological predispositions toward behaviors such as
chasing trends. Many financial economists (including ourselves),
believe, however, that the arbitrage activities of the smart money
speculators ("risk arbitrageurs") do not always fully counteract the
actions of these naive speculators. As a result, share prices will be
further from actual value than they would have been absent the
trading by the nai"ve speculators, the difference being speculative
noise.47 The more speculative noise in the market, the less accurate are
share prices.
There are reasons to believe that if less fundamental information is
gathered and reflected in share price, the attention of speculative
traders will turn more in the direction of speculative noise. If, relative
to fundamental information, this noise plays a larger role in
determining future share prices, speculators will get more reward for
trying to figure out future noise and less reward for trying to figure out
future cash distributions to shareholders.48 This reward structure
makes the effort to design social institutions that encourage the
gathering and analyzing of fundamental information and its reflection
47. See. e.g., Fisher Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986). Speculative noise can occur in the
view of these economists, even if there are smart money speculators in the market who trade
knowing a stock's fundamental value. Fundamental value is the price that would prevail if
the market consisted entirely of rational investors who possessed all available information
(i.e., the price that would prevail in a truly efficient market). The smart money speculators
are limited in their ability to arbitrage away the difference between what the share's market
price would be based on the trades of the noise traders and the share's fundamental value.
To start, unless the smart money speculators have an infinite time horizon, the uncertainty
created by the possibility of continued noise trading makes taking such a position inherently
risky even if the smart money speculators know for certain a stock's actual value. This is
because they know at the time they are contemplating a purchase that because of noise,
price at the end of their time horizon may still deviate from actual value. J. Bradford De
Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703 (1990).
Furthermore, smart money speculators in fact do not know a stock's actual value with
certainty, they only know its fundamental value, which is the value implied by the available
fundamental information. Thus, fundamental value is just a more accurate guess concerning
actual value than is the noise-trade-influenced market price. This uncertainty as to the
stock's actual value adds to the smart money speculators' risk of arbitrage. See Andrei
Schliefer & Lawrence Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP.
19 (1990); see also Fox, supra note 24, at 36-43, 55-59. It should also be noted that the very
fact that gathering and analyzing information privately is costly means that despite the
existence of smart-money speculators, space exists for noise trading to occur. This is because
of the "efficient-market paradox" noted by Grossman and Stiglitz, who observe that
"because [acquiring private] information is costly, prices cannot perfectly reflect the
information which is available, since if it did, those who spent resources to obtain it would
receive no compensation." Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 44, at 405. An excellent survey in
the legal literature of the work of the noise theorists, together with an analysis of its legal
implications, is found in Donald Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities
Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992).
48. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST
AND MONEY 157 (1936). Grossman and Stiglitz make the inverse of this point, suggesting
that if the cost of gathering and analyzing private information is lower, there will be a higher
intensity of trading by the smart money speculators, which will lead to "more informative
pricing." Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 44, at 404.
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in price doubly important in terms of share price accuracy.
Accordingly, it makes the determination of the effectiveness of
mandatory disclosure that much more important.
B.

Share Price Informedness
1.

The Concept

"Share price informedness" is closely related to share price
accuracy. A share price is more informed at a given time if it reflects a
larger portion of all the fundamental information known, or, through
sufficient effort, knowable, by one or more persons in the world. Thus,
a fully informed price would reflect all knowable information at a
given point in time. Any fact that is at a given time unknowable will by
definition unpredictably (i.e., randomly) affect future shareholder
distributions. Because of this, a fully informed price, while not
perfectly accurate, would be both unbiased and the most accurate
price possible at the time. Therefore, all of the factors discussed above
that make a share price more accurate make it more informed as
well.49
While the concept of share price accuracy allows a simpler, more
direct story concerning the relationship between share prices and the
real economy, the concept of share price informedness serves two
useful functions in fully understanding this relationship. First, it avoids
the discomfort that some may feel about the deterministic nature of
the model behind the concept of share price accuracy. More
importantly, as will become clear when we discuss immediately below
the use of the R2 methodology to measure share price accuracy, the
concept of price informedness highlights the fact that price movement
can be a sign of share price accuracy rather than inaccuracy. This is
49. Share price accuracy and informedness can be pictured as follows. Consider an
analogy between the process by which bits of information are incorporated into share price
and sampling from a large urn containing one thousand balls. Assume that somewhere
between zero and .:me thousand of the balls are red and the rest are green. Prior to any
sampling of the urn, nothing is known about the ratio of red to green balls in the urn. A
share's actual value is analogous to the actual ratio of the red to green balls. A random
sample of the urn's balls is equivalent to the bits of information that are incorporated in
price. Even a small sample of balls provides an unbiased estimate of the actual ratio of red to
green balls. Similarly, in an efficient market, share price is an unbiased estimate of a share's
actual value even if there is not a great deal of information available. The impact on the
estimate of drawing another ball from the urn is unknowable - it could increase or decrease
the estimate of the actual ratio - but the more balls that are drawn from the urn - i.e., the
larger the sample - the greater the expected accuracy of the estimate. Similarly, the impact
of a new bit of information on share price is unknowable prior to its availability - it could
increase or decrease price - but its incorporation in price will increase the price's expected
accuracy as an estimate of the share's actual value. The ratio of red to green balls in the
largest sample possible at any point in time will provide the most accurate possible estimate
of the actual ratio in the urn. Similarly, a fully informed price at a given point in time is the
most accurate estimate possible at that time of the actual value of the share.
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because price movement may indicate, at least in part, an ongoing
process by which new fundamental infonaation is being reflected in
price.
2.

Relationship of Share Price Accuracy to Price Movement

In essence, there are two countervailing considerations at work in
terms of the relationship between price accuracy and price movement.
This can be seen most easily in the case of a firm that in its lifetime
makes only a single distribution, at the time of its liquidation, although
the points made here are generalizable to a firm that makes multiple
distributions over time. The first force relates to the expectation
discussed above, that, for all issuers, the deviation between share price
and actual value will tend to decrease as the length of time before final
distribution decreases.50 Taking account of just this first consideration,
at any given point in time relative to the moment of final distribution,
the more accurate the price is, the less share price movement we
would expect to see thereafter as price eventually approaches actual
value. This is because where the price is more accurate, it is already
closer to actual value and hence has less further distance to travel.
Consequently, if only this consideration were at work, where we
observe over a period of time relatively little movement in the price of
an issuer's shares, we would assume that on average its share price
would be more accurate than the share price of an issuer displaying
more movement.
The second consideration is the amount of new information
relevant to an issuer's future cash distributions that on an ongoing
basis is being gathered, analyzed, and reflected in price. This second
consideration can potentially work in the other direction. Just taking
account of the second consideration, more movement may suggest
greater accuracy. Consider firms A and B. Assume that A and B will
each make a single distribution of the same amount, at liquidation, on
the same date sometime in the future. At any point in time, therefore,
the shares of the two firms have the same actual value. To control for
the first consideration, assume that at the beginning of the period of
observation, the prices of A's and B 's shares are equally distant from
the shares' actual values. After this, substantial amounts of new
information about firm A are, on an ongoing basis, being gathered,
analyzed and reflected in its share price. Each newly arriving bit of
information will on average move price closer to actual value but will,
as appears to be the case in the real world, include a significant
amount of random noise.51 Thus, bit by bit, price may move one way
50. See supra Part 11.A.2.a.
51. The random noise being referred to here is not the speculative noise referred to in
Part 11.A.3, supra. It simply reflects the idea that any new piece of information is not perfect.
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or the other, but the total effect of the cumulating bits will on average
be moving A's price closer and closer toward the share's actual value.
Less of this updating is occurring with respect to firm B. We would
expect firm A to have, during the period of observation, a more
informed, and hence more accurate, price than firm B because the
updating information is on average moving its share price closer to
actual value. If the random-noise element of each bit is sufficiently
large, however, A's share price will display more price movement on
average than B's, since new bits of information arrive more frequently,
and with the arrival of each new bit comes random noise that causes
price movement.52 So, where there is a significant random-noise
While, on an expected basis, each bit of information moves price toward actual value, it
contains a random element that in any given case may move price in the opposite direction.
In terms of the analogy in note 49, supra, comparing the incorporation of information into
securities prices with sampling from an urn containing one thousand red and green balls in
an undetermined proportion, the new bit of information is like a collection of balls some of
which are from the urn and the rest of which are randomly added from a side collection
which is half red balls and half green balls. The person doing the sampling knows the
average number of balls drawn from the side collection but no more. Each sample adds to
the accuracy of the estimate of the ratio of red to green balls in the urn despite the noise
from the balls drawn from the side collection.
52. Consider the following example to demonstrate the plausibility of the proposition
that firm A, whose price is more frequently updated by new information than firm B's, will
have on average a more accurate price but will have price changes displaying a greater
variance than do firm B's price changes. Suppose that firms A and B will each pay out a
single shareholder distribution, which will occur at liquidation. Both will liquidate at t,. and
each will pay out $10 per share at that time. Assuming for simplicity a discount rate of zero
(i.e., pricing is in accordance with CAPM and there is no time value of money or systematic
risk), each firm's shares will have an actual value of $10 throughout the life of the firm.
Suppose also that at t0 a share of each firm's stock has a price of $15 and so each starts out
with an equally inaccurate price.
Firm A's price is updated in each of the five periods by a new bit of information. The bit
of new information in each of periods t" t,. t, and t, contains two elements. One element is
like an accurate missing piece in the puzzle and moves the price $1 closer toward actual
value. The other element is noise: it is random and has an expected value of 0. Investors can
only observe the aggregate implications of the two elements combined. Thus, on an expected
basis, A's price becomes more accurate after the receipt of each bit of information, but the
observable aggregate implication of the bit involves variation around what would be implied
by the accurate-piece-of-the-puzzle element alone. The bit of new information at t, is the
announcement of the liquidating distribution. The price at t, is therefore $10 and is perfectly
accurate. This model, in which new information, on the one hand, helps to bring price
toward actual value but, on the other hand, is less than perfect, follows in the tradition of
R.W. Holthausen & R.E. Verrecchia, The Effect of Sequential Information Releases on the
Variance of Price Changes in an Intertemporal Multi-Asset Market, 26 J. ACCT. RES. 82
( 1988), and K.R. Subramanyam, Uncertain Precision and Price Reactions to Information, 71
Acer. REV. 207 (1996).
Firm B's price is not updated at all until t, but, for it too, the bit of information at t, is the
announcement of the liquidating distribution. Its price at t, is therefore also a perfectly
accurate $10.
The following prices provide an example consistent with this story. Firm A has a price at
t0 of $15. At t,, the price is $12.50 (the result of a noise element of -$1.50, which, when
combined with the accurate-piece-of-the-picture element, moves the price in aggregate down
by 2.50). At t,. the price is $14.50 (the result of a noise element of +$3.00, which, when
combined with the accurate-piece-of-the-picture element, moves the price in aggregate up by
$2.00). At t,, the price is $10.50 (the result of a noise element of -$3.00, which, when
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combined with the accurate-piece-of-the-picture element, moves the price in aggregate down
by $4.00). At t,, the price is $11.00 (the result of a noise element of +$1.50, which, when
combined with accurate piece of the picture element, moves the price in aggregate up by
$.50). At t,, the price equals the share's actual value of $10 (the result of the noiseless
announcement of the liquidating distribution, providing the last missing piece of the picture).
Thus the noise element in this example has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 2.37 .
Firm B's price stays at $15 for periods t,, t,, t, and t, and drops to $10 in period t,, when the
liquidating dividend is announced. The paths of the share prices of A and B are depicted in
Figures 1 and 2 below.
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As shown in Table I below, firm A's price changes display a greater variance than firm
B 's (5.5 versus 5.0) even though firm A's share price is on average closer to its actual value
of $10 - i.e., more accurate - than firm B's share price. This greater accuracy can be
observed simply from looking at Figures 1 and 2. A more precise measure of average share
price accuracy would be the average of the squared deviations of share price from actual
value in periods t,, t,, t,, t,,, and t, (the smaller the figure, the more accurate the price). As
shown in Table I below, the average of these squared deviations for firm A is 5.55 and for
firm B is 20.

TABLE I
Firm A
(1 )

( 2)

Accurate
-piece-ofthepuzzle
element

Random
noise
element

(3)

Total
effect

(4)

(5 )

(6)

Price

Square
of
price
change

Square of
deviation of
price from actual
value of $10

15

to
t,

-1

-1.5

-2.5

12.50

6.25

6.25

t,

-1

+3.0

+2.0

14.50

4

20.25

t3

-1

-3.0

-4.0

10.50

16

.25

t,

-1

+1.5

+.5

1 1 .00

.25

1

t,

-1

0

-1

10.00

1

0

-5

0

-5

27.5

27.75

5.5

5.55

Tota
1

Variance or average square of deviation
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element to new information, taking account of just this second
consideration, the more accurate the share price is at a given time, the
more share price movement we would expect
to see.
Firm B

(1)

(2)

Accurate
-piece-ofthepuzzle
element

Random
-noise
element

(3)

Total
effect

to

(4)

(5 )

( 6)

Price

Square
of
price
change

Square of
deviation of
price from actual
value of $10

15

t,

0

0

0

15

0

25

t2

0

0

0

15

0

25

t,

0

0

0

15

0

25

t.

0

0

0

15

0

25

t,

-5

0

-5

10

25

0

Total

-5

0

-5

25

100

5

20

Variance or average square of deviation

This example is generalizable to ongoing firms not facing immediate liquidation.
Specifically, the result that firm A will have on average a more accurate share price and will
display a higher price variance is replicable under the following changed assumptions.
Imagine a five period cycle in which once every fifth time period the prices of firm A and B
are equally accurate. Firm A is updated every period. Firm B is updated only every fifth
period, but with a bigger piece of information so that, after the updating, its price is for the
moment as accurate as firm A's. The example above now illustrates one such cycle with each
firm starting at an equally inaccurate $15 at t0 and each ending up at an equally more
accurate $10 in t,, but with firm A making adjustments along the way. The same calculations
as in the example above show that in this case too, firm A has on average greater share price
accuracy and greater price variance.
We are not claiming that more frequent updating inevitably results in the combination of
greater share price variance and greater share price accuracy. Whether or not it does
depends on the amount of noise in the updating bits of information. The example only
illustrates that greater share price accuracy can plausibly be accompanied by greater share
price variance. There are other possibilities as well. If the random-noise element is
sufficiently small, firm A could, compared with firm B, have a combination of smaller price
variance and greater share price accuracy. If the random-noise element is sufficiently large,
firm A could, compared with firm B, have a combination of larger price variance and less
share price accuracy. It is an empirical question whether the example in fact illustrates the
typical situation. Studies discussed below in Part 11.C suggest, however, that the example is
typical, which means that where we observe greater variance, prices are more accurate.
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In the real world, both considerations are at work. The first
consideration is working so that greater price movement suggests less
share price accuracy and the second is working,, at least if information
bits contain sufficient noise, so that greater price movement suggests
greater share price accuracy. We can say as a theoretical matter that
the second consideration would be more important relative to the first
in the case of relatively short-term (e.g., day-to-day or week-to-week)
price changes compared to longer-term (quarter-to-quarter, year-to
year, or decade-to-decade) price changes, because with the longer
term price changes the noise elements of the day-to-day updates tend
to cancel each other out. But this observation does not tell us, for any
given term's price changes, which consideration predominates.
Whether greater price movement indicates greater or lesser price
accuracy is ultimately an empirical question. We will discuss
immediately below strong empirical support for the conclusion that in
the case of relatively short-term price changes, more movement
indicates greater share price accuracy.53
C.

The R2 Methodology
1.

Overview

The methodology that we use to determine the informedness of
share prices and hence their accuracy involves a measure, which we
call R , of the extent to which share prices of an economy's issuers
move together.54 For the reasons discussed below, R2 appears to be a
good inverse proxy for how much fundamental information
concerning future shareholder distributions is impounded in share
prices: the lower the R2, the more accurate the
share price.
Indirect Evidence That R2 Is a Good Inverse Proxy for Share Price
Accuracy

2.

The idea that R2 is a good inverse proxy for share price accuracy
initially arose from the observation by Morck, Yeung, and Yu
("MYY") that countries vary a great deal in the extent to which share
prices of their firms tend to move together, the phenomenon
53. See infra Parts Il.C.2-3.
54. The R' measure for an individual country is computed as follows. For each
individual issuer j in the country, run a regression using time series data on the issuer's share
rate of return whereby r;.. P;.o + P;.mrm_. + P;j r;,. + E;.. . with rm market return; r; industry
retµrn. Then ,decompose the total variance <Qf the issuer's return as follows:
u '
u m + u ,
. R' for firm j is then defined as (o-; + ,,-;i . R' for the country is an average of
the R's for its individual issuers, weighted by the total variation of each stock's return. From
this formula, one can see that there is more firm-specific variation when R' is low.
=

=

=

=
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measured by R2 •55 This difference among countries is shown
dramatically in Figure 3. For example, for most weeks during the first
half of 1995, in each of China, Malaysia, and Poland, over 80% of
stocks moved in the same direction; for the same period in each of
Denmark, Ireland, and the United States, there was not a single week
in which as many as 58 % of firms moved in the same direction
(despite, in the case of the United States, the then ongoing bull
market).56 These startling differences cry out for explanation.

55. Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging
Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215, 217-19 (2000).
56. Id. Data from other periods in the 1990s behave similarly. Id.
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Figure 3
Average Fraction of Firm-Level Return Variation
Explained By Market Indexes
Poland ilk

; %¥
£¥
'.\Mm.
fa&
MM ..
, JL Eli!! ! UlIBfi!l
tltl
JIBflli!it HJ!!I
&BE! J fl
.i
&
!J!iiil
li!it£li!i li!it£li!!L
!lJ!!£tltl3& J
AL
MmlJtfai
li!it£li!iJ!!£!Lii
n
LtlflI!lllf;di
t!E!li!!Cli!it£li!i
ll!tliiili!it£l

China -

Malaysia
Taiwan
Turkey
Mexico
Peru
Thailand
Japan

Chile �
Columbia �
South Africa J!!£J!!£i1A£LL&lLWi!E!li
Spain Mt�

Greece li!it£li!i

. La'

Singapore L2!tl3!lL&LlLLl
India li!it£li!i;LiJ!1Al£LLli!itl
Czech -1

Italy li!it£li!ili!itE1E!li!ili!it£li!
Pakistan li!it£li!i?J£.iE!li!it'lLBJltlI
Korea !�'411£�!

Philippines fltJW&lJ!!£Cli!it£li!i

Brazil rna?lk'Wli!itltlI
Hong Kong tli!itltl3li!it£J!!£
Belgium Cli!it£li!iCli!

Finland &'fli!itltl3L[J0lt0WA!l
Sw eden Cli!it£li!iCli!
Indonesia L&llfal1taJ!i£t'JI
Norway mMMtut'MMMM

Germany li!it£li!ili!it
'B
Holland ACli!it£li!ili!
Austria 1Jm1JtMMM

Denmark li!it£li!iCt
France t!m'WL
Portugal Ltltl3ltt
N . Z . Ltltl311

Australia nnz
U . K. Lli!itltl3
Canada Lli!itltl3
Ireland mm

United States

0%

1 0%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

2
a. The link between R , poor quality government, and risk arbitrage
MYY try to explain these national differences by exploring the
factors that seem to be associated with low and high R2 scores. They
observe, as illustrated in Figure 3, that developed countries, with high
per capita GDP, tend to have low R2s, and emerging countries, with
2
low per capita GDP, tend to have high R s. There is no obvious reason
why low per capita GDP would lead directly to a greater tendency for
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share prices to move together. More likely, MYY reason, low per
capita GDP is associated with other national characteristics that lead
to this result.57 MYY try to identify what these other characteristics
might be, and in the process find evidence that R2 is a good inverse
proxy for how much fundamental information is impounded in share
prices.
MYY first consider a number of obvious structural characteristics
that appear likely, a priori, to affect a country's R2•58 One is country
size.59 Firms in a small country might be more uniformly subject to
environmental influences such as bad weather or nearby geopolitical
instability. Small countries also tend to have more uniform factor
endowments, making their overall economies more sensitive to
changes in relative factor prices such as the price of oil. A second
structural characteristic is the extent of the diversity of a country's
firms across industries: the less the diversity of the industries, the more
likely that the fortunes of all firms will move together.60 A third
structural characteristic, which serves as a kind of catchall, is the
extent to which the earnings of a country's firms tend to move
together.61
MYY run a regression with a log transformation of country R2s as
the dependent variable (the variable to be explained) and with per
capita GDP and measures of each of these three structural
characteristics as the independent variables (the variables that
potentially explain the dependent variable). The coefficient for per
capita GDP remains statistically significant. Continuing with the
proposition that there is no reason why low per capita GDP would
lead directly to share prices moving together, the continued
significance of the per capita GDP coefficient suggests it is a proxy for
yet additional country characteristics, institutional rather than
structural, that help explain the variation in R2 •62 MYY add to the
regression one additional independent variable, a measure for "good
government. "63 This measure consists of the sum of the scores for each
country on indexes created by La Porta et al. 64 relating to government
corruption, risk of government expropriation, and risk of
governmental contract repudiation. With the addition of this factor,
57. Id. at 227-28.
58. Id. at 230-41.
59. Id. at 231 .
60. Id. a t 231-32.
61. Id. at 232-33.
62. Id. at 241.
63. Id.
64. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL ECON. 1 1 13, 1 140 (1998)
[hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance].
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the coefficient for per capita GDP becomes insignificant.65 In sum, the
reasons that countries vary in their R2s are not just differences in their
structural characteristics such as country size and diversity of industry.
An institutional factor - the quality of government - appears to play
an important role as well.
The discovery that governmental quality plays an important role in
explaining differences among countries leads MYY to hypothesize
that R2 might be a good inverse proxy for price informedness.66 We
believe this is a plausible hypothesis. Our reasoning begins with the
observation that the predictability of future cash distributions to a
firm's outside shareholders depends on two factors: one is the
predictability of the level of the firm's underlying cash flows; the
second is the predictability of the division of these underlying cash
flows between the outside shareholders on the one hand and inside
shareholders and other firm stakeholders on the other.
In countries with low good-government scores, extralegal
governmental influence will play a larger role in determining both the
level of firm cash flows and the division of these cash flows. In low
good-government score countries, a firm's profitability can be
dramatically affected by whether or not it has close relationships with
governmental officials - the persons who grant government contracts,
issue licenses, and determine when to enforce regulations. Also, in
such countries the division of a firm's cash flows will deviate from the
standard corporate law model of pro-rata distribution among all
shareholders. Instead, inside shareholders receive, in one form or
another, more than a pro-rata share of the wealth generated by a
firm's activities, and other stakeholders receive more than a market
return for their contributions to the firm.67 These deviations come at
the expense of outside shareholders. The closer a firm's inside
shareholders and other stakeholders are to governmental officials, the
greater the governmental tolerance of such deviations.
This larger extralegal governmental influence on the amount of
distributions ultimately reaching outside shareholders makes these
distributions harder to predict. To start, in low-score countries, the
cash flow levels of firms themselves are harder to predict. This is
because the impact of extralegal governmental influences on cash
flows from one firm to the next is harder to predict than the purely
market factors that would determine firm cash flows in the absence of
such influence. The problem of predicting the impact of such influence
65. Morck et al., supra note 55, at 241 .
66. Id. a t 242-43.
67. Russia provides an excellent case study of this problem. See Bernard Black et al.,
Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1731 (2000); Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons from
Russian Enterprise Fiascoes, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720, 1740-45, 1762-71 (2000).
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on the cash flows of any one particular firm is aggravated by the
opaque, erratic nature of political regimes prevalent in many emerging
countries.68 In addition, the proportion of this cash flow that will
ultimately be paid to outside shareholders of a firm in a low-score
country is itself less predictable. In such a country, outside
shareholders are, as noted, relatively unprotected legally.69 The total
amount of distributions that these shareholders receive over the life of
the firm is arbitrary. Outsiders receive what is left over, if anything,
after the inside shareholders and other stakeholders have taken what
their positions of political power allow them to get, plus, perhaps, the
occasional distribution to outsiders made for strategic reasons.
The last step in our reasoning concerns the effect of these less
predictable distributions to outside shareholders on the process of
share pricing. When future distributions to outside shareholders are
' harder to predict, na"ive speculators - the "noise traders" - are more
likely to become confused. This confusion on the part of the noise
traders adds to the risk undertaken by rational smart money
speculators - the risk arbitrageurs - who bet against such noise
traders.70 This added risk makes it less attractive to be a risk
arbitrageur, which means less such activity occurs in the economy.
Less information about fundamentals (both firm-specific and market
wide) is incorporated into share price because fewer risk arbitrageurs
find it worthwhile to gather, analyze, and act on such information. As
a result, the trading of the na"ive speculators ("noise trading") has a
greater impact on price and share prices will less accurately reflect
what the distributions to outside shareholders will ultimately tum out
to be.71 This problem of a low level of risk arbitrage in countries with
low good-government measures may be accentuated by the fact that in
such countries, risk arbitrageurs may be less confident that they will be
able to retain the profits that they do manage to make due to the
possibility of confiscation.72 This lower level of risk arbitrage, with its
consequent lower level of price informedness and hence price
accuracy and higher level of noise trading, can be expected to be
accompanied by the higher R2s that we observe in the low good
government score countries. This is because the fads and fashions that
motivate na"ive speculative traders tend to have uniform impact across
the market.
68. Morck et al., supra note 55, at 242-44. The idea that there will be more noise trading
when future distributions to outside shareholders are less predictable is consistent with the
idea that when less information is publicly available, less trading based on privately acquired
and analyzed information will occur. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
70. De Long et al., supra note 47, at 733; see also supra Part 11.A.3.
7 1 . Morck et al., supra note 55, at 244-47.
72. Id. at 243.

December 2003)

Share Price Accuracy

363

In sum, the link between high R2s and low price informedness is
established as follows. High R2s are observed to be associated with low
good-government scores.73 Low good-government scores suggest that
extralegal governmental influence will play a substantial role in
determining future distributions to outside shareholders. The impact
of this influence is harder to predict than the market forces that would
otherwise determine the level of such distributions, thereby making
the distributions themselves less predictable. This unpredictability
confuses nai've speculative traders, causing them to act in ways that
add to the risk of smart money speculation. This added risk depresses
the level of risk-arbitrage activity, which has two consequences: one is
that less information is impounded in prices, the other is that the nai've
speculative traders have a larger role in setting prices. The fads and
fashions that motivate the nai've speculative traders tend to have
impacts across the market, and hence the larger role in the market
played by the nai've speculative traders results in prices of different
firms tending to move together more. As a consequence, country R2s
will be higher. Thus, everything else being equal, a high R2 is
indicative of a low level of risk arbitrage, which will result in a low
level of price informedness.
b. Further implications of the link between R2 and poor-quality
government
The implications of our analysis for share price informedness,
however, go even deeper than this. It is true that the mechanisms of
real economic efficiency promoted by share price accuracy still work
to some extent even when prices are relatively less accurate. The
greater extralegal governmental influence that drives up R2 , however,
not only leads to a lower level of share price accuracy, it also makes
this lower level of price accuracy even less effective than it would
otherwise be in promoting the functioning of these mechanisms of real
economic efficiency. To see why, recall that a share price is less
accurate when it is less likely to be close to the share's actual value,
which is the discounted present value of what the future distributions
to outside shareholders will ultimately turn out to be. In low good
government score countries, a significant factor in this lower level of
share price accuracy is the underlying unpredictability concerning the
proportion of a firm's underlying overall cash flow that will ultimately
reach outside shareholders. Thus, share price is doubly less informed
in terms of being an estimate of the firm's underlying overall cash
flows. This result is critical because the theory suggesting that accurate
share prices enhance real economic efficiency assumes that accurate

73. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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share prices are good estimates of future underlying overall firm cash
flow.74 A firm's residuals are, under this theory, assumed reliably to go
largely to its shareholders, and every shareholder, whether inside or
outside, is assumed to receive a pro-rata distribution of these
residuals. In short, share prices in a country with a low quality
government are doubly disabled in their capacity to promote
efficiency in the real economy. First, because there is less risk
arbitrage, share prices are poorer predictors of future distributions to
outside shareholders. Second, future distributions to outside
shareholders are themselves less reliable indicators of a firm's
underlying cash flow. It is the accuracy of prices as predictors of firm
cash flows that promotes the effectiveness of the mechanisms of
efficiency in the real economy.75
c. Other indirect evidence that R2 is a good inverse proxy for price
informedness
Two other pieces of indirect evidence help support the hypothesis
that R 2 is an inverse proxy for price informedness. First, the average
R2 for U.S. firms has decreased significantly over the twentieth
century, particularly since World War II.76 This corresponds to a
period in which, for both technological and institutional reasons, more
information has become available for risk arbitrageurs to use, even
putting mandatory disclosure aside.
Second, MYY examined a subsample consisting of R2s of all the
developed countries in their study. In the regressions they ran to try to
explain the differences in R2s among these countries, they included, as
an additional independent variable, another La Porta et al.77 index,
one purporting to measure the protection of outside shareholders
through rights that help them control directors. MYY found that the
coefficient for this index was negative and statistically significant, thus
suggesting an inverse relationship between the level of such
protections and country R2 •78
MYY's explanation for this result starts with the assumption that
in a country with weak protection for outside shareholders, managers
will find it easier to divert a larger portion of the firm's cash flow to
themselves.79 These managers are more likely to divert extra cash flow
generated by favorable firm-specific developments than extra cash
74. See supra Part II.B.2.
75. See supra Part l.B.2.
76. Morck et al., supra note 55, at 220-22.
77. La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 64, at 1 126-28.
78. Morck et al., supra note 55, at 255.
79. Id. at 216-17.
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flow generated by favorable developments in the economy as a
whole.80 This is because a diversion of the firm-specific, development
gerterated income is less likely to be detected since outsiders know
more about changes in economy-wide factors than about changes in
firm-specific factors. Thus changes in firm cash flow due to changes in
economy-wide factors are more likely to be passed on to outside
shareholders. As a consequence, these changes in economy-wide
factors are likely to affect distributions to outside shareholders more
than they affect the underlying cash flow of the firm. The result will be
the higher R2s that are observed in the data for countries with a lower
level of protection for outside shareholders. This effect will be
accentuated by the fact that, relative to countries with more
protection, risk arbitrageurs in low-protection countries will rationally
devote more of their attention to predicting economy-wide factors and
less to predicting firm-specific factors. They will allocate their
attention in this fashion because these economy-wide factors play a
larger role in determining distributions to outside shareholders.81 In
conclusion, while the higher R2s in such countries do not necessarily
indicate that share prices are less accurate predictors of future
distributions to outside shareholders, they will be less accurate
predictors of underlying firm cash flows and thus will not perform
their real economy efficiency-enhancing functions as well as do share
prices in countries with greater shareholder protections.82
3.

Direct Test of R2 as a Proxy for Share Price A ccuracy

Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin ("DMYZ") examine more
directly the usefulness of R2 as an inverse proxy for share price
accuracy by examining the relationship between a firm's R2 and the
extent to which its share price reflects future versus current eamings.83
For a set of U.S. firms, DMYZ go back in time and regress each firm's
then-current stock price on its then-current and -future earnings. They
find that future earnings explain more of the share prices of low R2
firms than firms with high R . In other words, share prices of lower R2
firms are better predictors of their future earnings than share prices of
high R2 firms.
This finding provides much more direct evidence that low R2 firms
have more accurate share prices. Remember that a more accurate
share price is one that better predicts future shareholder distributions.
Future distributions can only come from presently known existing
80. Id. at 254.
81. Id.
82. See supra Part 11.A.2.
83. Artyom Durnev et al., Does More Firm Specific Stock Price Variation Mean More or
Less Informed Pricing?, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 797 (2003).
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assets or future cash flows; and future earnings are, on average, a
reasonably good proxy for future cash flows.
III. SHARE PRICE ACCURACY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE REAL
ECONOMY
The adherents of the position that share price accuracy is relevant
to efficiency believe, based primarily on theory, that share price
accuracy improves the quality of choice among new proposed
investment projects in the economy and improves the operation of
existing firm assets.84 Two recent studies that examine the relationship
of R2 and measures of the efficiency of capital allocation help to
confirm empirically the existence of at least the first of these two
effects.
A.

Cross- Country Comparisons

The first study, conducted by Professor Jeffrey Wurgler, involves
cross-country comparisons.85 Wurgler constructs a measure of the
efficiency of capital allocation that posits that capital is well allocated
when there is more investment in industries that are growing rapidly
and less investment in declining industries. Using a data set that spans
twenty-eight manufacturing industries across sixty-five countries and
over thirty-three years, Wurgler finds a significant negative
relationship between this measure of capital allocation efficiency and
highly synchronized stock price returns.86 Thus, capital appears more
likely to be allocated to the most promising investment opportunities
in countries with low synchronized stock returns than in countries with
high ones.

84. See supra Part l.B.2.

85. Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the A llocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON.
187 (2000).
86. Wurgler's measure is an elasticity of capital expenditure with respect to value added,
i.e.,
I

V

1,c,t-I

t,c,t-1

In �
= ac + 1]c Jn _.!£!_
+ &.1.c.t
/.
V,
where I is gross fixed capital formation, V is value added (sales minus cost of intermediate
goods), and i, c, and t are subscripts for manufacturing industry, country, and time,
respectively. Wurgler's results, when combined with our results reported infra in Part IV
suggesting that mandatory disclosure can lower R', are consistent with findings by La Porta
et al. that laws that protect outside investors, including mandatory disclosure laws, improve
the efficiency of investment allocation. Rafael La Porta et. al., Investor Protection and
Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (2003) .
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Cross-Industry Comparisons

The second study, conducted by Durnev, Morck, and Yeung,
involves cross-industry comparisons within the United States.87 This
study uses a somewhat different measure of the efficiency of
investment allocation, looking at each firm's marginal Tobin's Q ratio,
which measures a firm's increase in market value relative to its
increase in the book value of its capital stock.88 In a tax-free world, the
optimal level of this measure is one. A value greater than one suggests
that positive net present value ("NPV") projects are being missed, and
thus the firm is passing up projects that would cost less than their
expected future returns discounted to present value. A value less than
one suggests that negative NPV projects are being implemented, and
thus that the firm is investing in projects that cost more than the
present value of future expected returns. An economy is making the
most efficient use of its scarce savings when it implements all proposed
investment projects with positive NPVs and no proposed projects with
negative NPVs. Durnev, Morck, and Yeung find that the closeness of
this measure to its optimal level is inversely related to the industry's
average R2 • This result holds up after controlling for differences
among industries in the extent to which their earnings are sensitive to
economy-wide factors. Importantly for adherents to the share price
relevance position, the result also holds whether or not firms in the
industry engage in extensive external financing. This finding is
contrary to what would have been predicted by the institutional
skeptics among the share price irrelevance adherents, who doubt the
relevance of share price accuracy to the real economy because of the
small percentage of new investment that is funded by public offerings
of equity.89
C.

An Answer to the First Big Question

These cross-country and cross-industry studies demonstrate that
low R2 is associated with high measures of investment allocation
efficiency. This finding, combined with the findings reported above
that low R2 is associated with greater share price accuracy, leads to the
important conclusion that more accurate share prices improve the
quality of choice among new proposed investment projects in the
economy. Thus, we have an affirmative answer to the first big

87. Artyom Durnev et al., Value Enhancing Capital Budgeting and Firm-specific Stock
Return Variation, 59 J. FIN. 65 (2004).
88. Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of a company's debt and equity to the
current replacement cost of its assets. See James Tobin, A General Equilibrium Approach to
Monetary Theory, l J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 15 (1969).
89. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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question. Contrary to the position of the irrelevance adherents, the
empirical evidence suggests that the efficiency of the real economy
(the actual production of goods and services) is enhanced when share
prices become more accurate.
IV.

MANDATORY D ISCLOSURE AND SHARE PRICE ACCURACY

We still need to address the second big question: do mandatory
disclosure requirements in fact result in the revelation of useful
information, as adherents of the mandatory disclosure effectiveness
position believe, or does most of the information impounded in share
prices come via routes other than mandatory disclosure, as the
ineffectiveness adherents believe?
Prior empirical research relating to this question has focused
primarily on the effect on share price and on price variance from the
imposition in the 1930s of the Securities Act's and Exchange Act's
mandatory disclosure provisions. The overall conclusion is that there
was no statistically significant price change as a result of these
requirements, but that there was a reduction in variance. As indicated
in Part II, the implications of the reduction in firm-specific variance
are ambiguous.9()
In this Part of the Article, we present the results of a study that
uses the R2 methodology to examine more directly the price-accuracy
effects of mandatory disclosure. The study concerns the effects of a
change in disclosure rules in December 1980 that enhanced
requirements concerning management's discussion and analysis of
issuer financial condition and operating results (MD &A). This change
for the first time in effect required managers to disclose any material
information suggesting that the issuer's most recent results are not
necessarily indicative of future operating results or future financial
condition. In the study, we observe a statistically significant reduction
in R2 after imposition of the new requirements. This suggests that
share prices did in fact become more informed as a result of the
enhanced MD&A requirements. Such a result is strong evidence that
mandatory disclosure can in fact increase the amount of meaningful
information reflected in share prices and increase share price
accuracy.
A.

History of the Enhanced

MD&A

Requirements

The SEC historically prohibited disclosure of forward-looking
information in SEC filings with the stated purpose of protecting

90. See supra Part Il.B.
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unsophisticated investors.91 This prohibition was much criticized since
share valuations depend on future cash flows and management has
significant insight concerning the factors that will determine these cash
flows.92 Starting in the 1970s, the SEC began to soften and then
ultimately reverse its stance. In 1974, the SEC's Division of
Corporation Finance issued the Guides for the Preparation and Filing

of Reports and Registration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

that included a new Guide 1 (Summary of Operations).93 Taking the
position that issuer disclosure, in addition to the "columnar
presentation of financial data," required information of "material
significance to investors in appraising the results shown," the 1 974
Guides called for "the type of supplementary information needed to
explain periodic changes in financial data included in the summary of
earnings."94
In the 1 974 Guides, the SEC also added a requirement for a
separate section in issuer disclosure documents entitled
"Management's Discussion and Analysis," to be placed after the
summary of earnings. In stating what it wanted� the SEC gave its first
highly tentative bow toward requiring forward-looking information:
The purpose of this statement is to provide investors with management's
analysis of the financial data included in the summary through a
discussion of the causes of material changes in the items of the summary
and of disclosure of the dollar amount of each such change and the effect
of each such change on the reported results for the applicable periods.
This discussion is necessary to enable investors to compare periodic
results of operations and to assess the source and probability of
recurrence of earnings (losses).95

Issuers, however, tended to read these requirements narrowly and
in December 1 980, the SEC adopted, through revisions of Item 303(a)

91. See Disclosure to Investors - A Reappraisal of Administrative Policies Under the
'33 and '34 Acts, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 74,601, at 74,603 (Feb. 2, 1973) [hereinafter
Wheat Report] ("[P]rojections in filed documents might become traps for the unsophisticated
who would be prone to attach more significance to such projections than they deserve."); see
also Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus.
LAW. 300, 307 (1971) (noting that the SEC considered the investor as good as anyone at
predicting the future and that having companies attempt to predict future earnings would be
misleading because it would suggest a competence and authority in predicting that did not
exist). For one example of the SEC's policy prohibiting projections because they would be
misleading, see 17 C.F.R. § 270.14a-9 (1976) (withdrawn in 1 976) (proscribing predictions of
specific future market values, earnings, or dividends in proxy statements); see also Joel
Seligman, The SEC's Unfinished Soft Information Revolution, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1956
(1995).
92. See, e.g. , Kripke, supra note 33, at 1151.
93. See Securities Act Release No. 5520, 39 Fed. Reg. 31,894 (Sept. 3, 1974) [hereinafter
the 1974 Guides].
94. Id. at 31 ,895-96.
95. Id. at 31,895.
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of Regulation S-K, the much more explicit set of requirements in its
MD&A rules that are the subject of this study.96 These rules have been
essentially unchanged since.97 Specifically, Item 303(a)(3)(ii) requires
the issuer to "describe any trends or uncertainties that have had or
that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or
unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income"98 and to
report on "events that will cause a material change in the relationship
between costs and revenues."99 Most significantly, instruction 3 to
paragraph 303(a) tells issuers to "focus specifically on material events
and uncertainties known to management that would cause reported
financial information not to be necessarily indicative of future
operating results or future financial condition. "100 This instruction in
essence means that if there is no disclosure, investors are entitled to
view current results as a management projection of future results.
Dean Joel Seligman underscores the importance of these new
provisions, especially for troubled companies:
This Item is of particular significance for "troubled companies" and is a
key part of the evolution of the Commission's approach to accounting
from an emphasis on "hard facts" to its emphasis on "soft" or forward
looking information. It is a comprehensive disclosure item. In effect, the
Commission staff has employed the concepts of liquidity and capital
resources to require managers to comment on material changes that may
occur in a registrant's balance sheet. The Commission has used the
concept of results of operations to require similar disclosures concerning
a registrant's income statement.101

B.

Test Design and Procedures: Hypothesis HJ

The enhanced MD&A requirements imposed in December 1 980
present an excellent opportunity to test the effectiveness of mandatory
disclosure in promoting share price accuracy. The changed regulations
on their face call for disclosure of significant information that was not
previously required to be disclosed. We seek to determine whether
share price accuracy, as measured by R2, in fact improved as a result of
the changed regulations. We set up the test in a way that attempts to
96. Proposed Revision of Regulation S-K, Exchange Act Release No. 17,399, 21 SEC
DOCKET 1052 (Dec. 23, 1980).
97. Compare Regulation of Transfer Agents, Exchange Act Release No. 17,1 14, 20 SEC
DOCKET 1277 (Sept. 2, 1 980), and Amendments to Annual Report Form, 45 Fed. Reg.
63,630 (Sept. 25, 1980), with 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2003).
98. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Seligman, supra note 91, at 1968 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2003) and Exchange
Act Release No. 34,831 , Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 85,436, at 85,783 n.39 (Oct. 13, 1994)
(safe harbor for forward-looking statements)).
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best control for any other events occurring at the same time that might
also influence R2• We do this by comparing the change in R2 of two
groups of firms - high-return firms and middle-return firms - after
adoption of the regulation. As explained below, we have reason to
believe that the changed regulations, if effective, will promote more
additional disclosure by the middle-return firms than by the high
return firms and hence lead to a greater reduction in the R2s of the
middle-return firms relative to those of the high-return firms. We find
that the middle-return group indeed did have a greater reduction in
Rz.
1.

Assumption Driving Test Design

Our test design assumes that issuer managers will be more likely,
other things being equal, to reveal voluntarily in a timely fashion good
news than bad news. In addition to the tendency to put off unpleasant
tasks that seems part of human nature, managers of bad-news firms
often have incentives to defer revelation of the negative information.
They may hope, for example, that subsequent, chance good news will
obscure the effects of past, unrevealed mistakes. Also, their time
horizons may be shortened by their compensation schemes or pending
retirements and so an immediate price drop would hurt them while
one at some point in the future would not. This assumption that bad
news is disclosed more slowly is in accordance with both theoretical
and empirical findings on the matter.102 Thus, a smaller portion of
102 See HARRISON HONG ET AL., BAD NEWS TRAVELS SLOWLY 16 (Nat'! Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6553, 1998) (discussing the momentum strategy, which,
based on findings that for some stocks past share price changes predict future ones, works
much better for firms with low analyst coverage than high; this effect of low analyst coverage
is much more pronounced, however, where the firms are past losers than past winners
because firms release good news more freely than bad news and so the marginal contribution
of analysts in getting bad news out is greater than in getting good news out); Anne E.
Chambers & Stephen H. Penman, Timeliness of Reporting and the Stock Price Reaction to
Earnings Announcements, 22 J. ACCT. RES. 21, 39 (1984) (stating that interim and annual
earnings reports reported later than average, relative to their history, are accompanied by
negative share price reaction); William Kross & Douglas A. Schroeder, An Empirical
Investigation of the Effect of Quarterly Earnings Announcement Timing on Stock Returns, 22
J. Acer. RES. 153, 173 (1984) (same finding for quarterly earnings announcements); Lang &
Lundholm, supra note 45, at 269 (finding in an examination of cross-sectional variation of
published analysts' evaluations of firms' disclosure practices, that firms rated as having more
forthcoming disclosure have, after controlling for other factors, higher earnings and returns);
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101,
107-09 (1997) (stating that corporations do not disclose bad news for a variety of reasons:
one is the fear of high level management that doing so will have a negative effect on
employees or customers, two, there is a tendency for lower level employees to be less likely
to report bad news than good news up the line, and, three, there is a tendency for top
managers to have "perceptual filters" that cut out bad news, the filters being functional and
hence persistent because the optimism they reflect aids morale); Ranga Narayanan, Insider
Trading and the Voluntary Disclosure of Information by Firms, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 395
(2000) (outlining a theoretical model where bad news is less likely to be disclosed quickly
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firms experiencing bad news will voluntarily disclose it in the period in
which it is experienced compared to the portion of firms experiencing
good news.
2.

Implications

This difference in the timing of voluntary disclosure for firms with
good and bad news creates the opportunity to test whether an increase
in required disclosure results in greater share price accuracy. To the
extent that disclosure is voluntary, in a given year a firm experiencing
good news relative to other firms in its industry should have a better
return than the industry average that year because the firm is likely to
get its good news out quickly. A firm experiencing bad news relative
to other firms in its industry in a given year should, in contrast, have a
return (i ) below its industry average for that year where the bad news
is revealed during the year, or, ( ii) equal to the industry average for
that year where the bad news is not revealed during the year, with
share price instead being marked down in the subsequent year when
the bad news eventually does become revealed.
With this in mind, consider, for any given period and for any given
industry, three groups of firms:
1. The first group
the good-return group
are firms that
have market returns above the industry average by some
threshold percentage, for example 10% or more. These
firms have good news that occurred during this period.
2. The second group
the bad-return group
are firms
that have market returns below the industry average by
the threshold percentage or more. These firms have bad
-

-

-

-

than good news because. with good news, managers trade off the positive effects of speedy
disclosure on their performance-based compensation with the ability to make insider trading
profits afforded by delayed disclosure, but with bad news, there is no tradeoff, and only
delay provides an opportunity for profit); Marc I. Steinberg & Robin M. Goldman, Issuer
Affirmative Disclosure Obligations - An Analytical Framework for Merger Negotiations,
Soft Information, and Bad News, 46 MD. L. REV. 923, 948-49 (1987) (noting that "[i]ssuers

understandably wish to delay disclosure of adverse news as Jong as possible" out of fear, for
example, that immediate release of the bad news could cause a "snowball" effect in terms of
losing customers, which might not happen if release is delayed and better news intervenes to
soften it); Mark Lang & Russell Lundholm, Voluntary Disclosure and Equity Offerings:
Reducing Information Asymmetry of Hyping the Stock (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors) (finding that, on average, six months before issuing new equity, firms
increase their level of disclosure and much more of it is positive than negative information;
for firms that do this, price goes up during the period leading up to the offer and down
afterwards); Russell Lundholm & Linda Meyers, Bringing the Future Forward (2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (finding that firms with more forthcoming
disclosure policies have, after controlling fo r other factors, higher earnings and returns).
There are some dissenters to this view. For example, Douglas Skinner suggests that firms
who are expecting to announce a bad earnings report will disclose earlier in order to reduce
the risk of legal liability. Douglas Skinner, Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News, 32 J.
Acer. RES. 38, 38-39 (1994).
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news that is revealed during this period but that
occurred either in this period or in some prior period.
3. The third group
the middle-return group
are firms
that have market returns in between the other two
groups. These firms either have no news or have
unrevealed bad news.
This analysis of the relationship between each of the three groups
of firms and the kinds of news that they are experiencing has an
important testable implication. A regulatory reform that effectively
increases firm disclosure over what would be revealed voluntarily will
have a differential effect on the composition of these three groups of
firms in terms of the kinds of news they are currently experiencing.
Firms with current or past unrevealed bad news that they would, but
for the reform, have kept unrevealed will be in the bad-return group
instead of in the middle-return group. As a consequence, the middle
return group will now be composed of a less mixed set of firms: a
larger proportion will have no news and a smaller proportion will have
unrevealed bad news. Thus, a larger portion of middle-return group
firms will have prices that reasonably reflect their actual values. The
high-return group would not experience a similar change in
composition and thus for this group there would not be as great a
change, if any, in the portion whose prices reasonably reflect their
actual values.
-

3.

-

Testable Hypothesis

These implications suggest a testable hypothesis with respect to the
effect on share price accuracy of the enhanced MD&A requirements:
H l : If the enhanced requirements increase share price
accuracy, the decrease in the R2 of the middle-return
group should exceed the decrease in the R2 of the
good-return group.
4.

Advantages of the Test Design

This test design has a distinct advantage over a simple time series
comparison of the average R2 of all firms before and after imposition
of the enhanced MD&A requirements. R2 is affected by
macroeconomic and industry environmental factors that change from
one period to the next. In a simple time series comparison, these
changes would create noise that would make it harder to detect any
shift in the amount of information impounded in price as a result of
the enhanced MD&A requirements. Instead, we examine, by industry,
the change in R2 from before to after imposition of enhanced MD&A
requirements for the middle-return group relative to the parallel
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changes for the good-return group. This procedure washes out the
effects on R2 over this period of time from changes in industry and
macroeconomic factors. This is because there is little reason to think
that any changes in these factors would have a different impact on R2s
of the good-return group than on those of the middle-return group in
any given industry. The impact of the enhanced MD&A requirements
is thereby singled out.
5.

The Sample

We used the following sets of firms for our sample. For 1980, the
year before implementation of the enhanced MD&A requirements,
we selected a sample of 2690 firms from 130 three-digit SIC code
industries.103 For 1982, the year after implementation of the enhanced
MD&A requirements, we selected a sample of 2988 firms from the
same 130 three-digit industries. We calculated the R2s and annual
returns of all the firms in each year's sample.104 We sorted each year's
samples into the 130 different industries and, for each firm in each
industry, placed it into one of these groups:
G (good-return firms), each of which have a market return for the
year, r > ri3 * (1 + T)
B (bad-return firms), each of which have r < r;3 *(1 - T)
M (middle-return firms), each of which have r such that ri3 * (1 - T) <
r < r;3 *(l + T)
where r is the firm's return for the year, T is a fraction, and ri3 is the
average return in the firm's industry for the year. In our initial
calculations, we chose a threshold T of 10% or 0.10. Thus, for each
year, we had 390 observations: three return groups from each of 130
industries. We can then observe the change in the average R2 from
1980 to 1982 for each of the 390 industry return groups.
6.

The Calculations

We started our calculations, as indicated, by determining the R2 for
all the firms in each year's sample. We did this by running for each
year and for each firm a modified market model regression, with both
market and industry betas, 105 using weekly returns for each firm. The
103. The reform was adopted in December of 1980, too late to affect any significant
amount of disclosure in that year. We view 1981 as a transition year and thus use 1982 as the
postimplementation comparison year.
104. The sources of data about these firms were the CRSP and COMPUSTAT tapes.
105. The market and industry betas that come out of the regression form a measure of
the extent to which, respectively, market and industry-wide factors can be expected to move
each individual firm's returns.
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purpose of this calculation was to establish the amount of firm-specific
variation in the returns of each firm (i.e., the portion of the return that
does not co-move with the market). This firm-specific variation was
then used to calculate its R2 • A weighted average R2 was then
calculated for each of the three groups of firms, G, B and M, for each
of the 130 industries, for each of the two years. To make the data more
tractable to statistical analysis, each of these R2s was then transformed
to create a natural log based index, 'l'g, i3. i (g = the return group, i3 = the
industry, t = the year), that increases as the R2 decreases. 'I' is therefore
a direct, not an inverse, proxy for informedness. These calculations are
set out in detail in Table I in the Appendix.
7.

The Basic Statistical Test of Hypothesis HJ

Remember that in testing hypothesis Hl we are exammmg
whether, after adoption of the enhanced MD&A requirements, the
middle-return group's share prices became better informed relative to
those of the good-return group's prices. To determine this, we look at
the mean change in 'I', the informedness measure, for each of the two
groups. We see whether, consistent with hypothesis Hl, the mean
change for the middle-return group is positive relative to the mean
change for the good-return group. If so, we calculate the likelihood
that the difference is due only to chance because of the ordinary
underlying year-to-year variation in firm R2s. This calculation is made
in order to see how confidently we can rule out mere chance as the
explanation for the difference in R2s between the two groups.
More precisely, define for each group, G (good) or M (middle),
Ll'1'g,i3 = 'l'g,i3,s2 - 'l'g,;3•80, i.e., the change in our informedness measure for
return group g ( = G or M) in industry i3 from 1 980 to 1982. The null
hypothesis to be tested is that Ll 'I'M.i3 = Ll'I'c,;3, i.e., that the change in
the informedness measure is the same for the middle-return groups as
for the good-return groups. The alternative hypothesis Hl is
Ll'I'M ;3 > Ll'I'c ;3, i.e., that the change in informedness for the middle
retum group is greater than for the high-return group. The summary
results of the test are as follows:106
SUMMARY RESULTS: HYPOTHESIS Hl

Panel A: Stock return
variation measures
Differential log
transformation of relative

variable

Mean

std

mm

max

Ll'I'G

-0.070

0.708

-2.493

2.056

106. A more complete report of these test results is set out in Tables II and III.
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firm-specific variation of

G firms

0.995

- 1 .046

7.690

Differential log
transformation of relative
firm-specific variation of
M firms

0.45 1

Null Hypothesis

Test Statistic

Probability
Value

5. 149

(0.00)

Alternative
Hypothesis

These results show that, consistent with hypothesis H l , the middle
return group's mean improvement in the informedness measure, Ll1P,
is 1.985 greater than that of the good-return group (which actually
declined slightly). Given a t statistic of 5.149, it is extremely unlikely
that there was no actual change in the informedness of the prices of
the two groups and that the observed difference in our measure of
informedness is due simply to chance. Thus we can reject with a high
degree of statistical confidence the null hypothesis in favor of the
alternative hypothesis that after imposition of the enhanced MD&A
requirements, the middle-return group experienced a greater increase
in price informedness than did the good-return group. This strongly

suggests that the enhanced MD&A requirements did prompt the
disclosure of additional meaningful information.

8.

Multivariate Regression A nalysis of Hypothesis HJ

As a check on these results, we also did a multivariate regression
analysis of hypothesis Hl in order to see whether changes between
2
1980 and 1982 in other factors that influence firm R could explain the
difference between the two groups in the amount of change of their
R2s. We found that they could not. A firm's R2 may be affected by the
size of the industry to which it belongs and the structure of that
industry. As a way to control for the possibility that changes between
1980 and 1982 in one or both of these industry factors accounted for
the differences in the changes in R 2 for the two groups, we ran a
multivariate regression with the change of each return group from
each industry as the dependent variable (i.e., 390 observations,
consisting of the change in R2 from 1980 to 1982 for each of the three
return groups for each of the 130 industries) . As independent
variables, we paired against each of these 390 observations changes
between 1980 and 1982 in measures of these two industry factors for
the industry into which the observation fell, plus dummies for whether
or not the observation was in the good-return group, d0, and for
whether or not it was in the bad-return group, d8• Each dummy
equaled 1 if the observation was in its group and 0 if it
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was not.
In this test, hypothesis Hl would be confirmed if we could say with
statistical confidence that d0 < 0 and dB < 0. Such a result would mean
that after accounting for the effects of any changes in these industry
factors, changes in the measure of informedness were, for firms in the
good and bad-return groups, less than the average change for all firms.
This result would show that firms in the middle-return group had a
bigger change. In fact, as set out below, the calculations show that we
can say with statistical confidence that d0 < 0 and dB < 0.101
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS: HYPOTHESIS H l

Specification
Dependent variable
Good firms
industry
dummy

Good
firm d0

Bad firms
industry
dummy

Bad
firm d8

F

5.3
5. 2
I
I
Differential log transformation of relative
firm-specific return variation, D.'¥
5. 1

statistic

Regression R2
Number of observations

-0.521

-0.416

-0.429

(0.00)

(0.00)

-0.323

-0.136

-0.149

(0.00)

(0.30)

(0 . 30)

10.670

18.780

15.110

0.052

0.163

0.371

(0.00)

* Numbers in parentheses are p-values

9.

390

Test of Whether Recession Prompted Bad-News Firms to Disclose
Sooner

The period during which the enhanced MD&A requirements were
first taking effect was one marked by recession. This raises the
possibility that it was the recession, not the enhanced MD&A
requirements, that prompted firms with bad news to disclose it sooner
than they otherwise would have. To test for this possibility, we ran the
same tests as reported above, comparing the change in the
informativeness measure for middle-return firms with that of good
return firms, for two other periods in which a recession intervened:
1989-92 and 2000-2001. For each of these two other periods, we find
107. The control variables, the multivariate regressions, the simple correlations, and a
fuller report of the regression results are set out in Tables IV, V, VI, and VII.
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no statistically significant difference between the change in the
informativeness measure for the middle-return group compared to
that of the good-return group. The multivariate regression test for
these periods produces the same results. Consequently we reject the
possibility that it was the recession, not the enhanced MD&A
requirements, that prompted firms with bad news to disclose it sooner
than they otherwise would have after the imposition of these
requirements in 1980.
10. Robustness Tests

As a further check, we looked to be sure that the results reported
above are not an artifact of the particular periods that are compared
or the threshold percentages used to define the good-, bad-, and
middle-return groups. To do so, we ran our tests again using
alternative periods and thresholds. We tried 1978-80 vs. 1982-83 and
several other combinations of time periods. There was no change in
results. We tried as the return threshold level T= 0. 01, 0.02, 0.05, and
0. 15. There was again no change in results.
C.

Test Design and Procedures: Hypothesis H2
1.

Assumptions and Implications

The assumption that issuer managers are more likely to report
good news in a timely fashion than bad news, combined with the
analysis above concerning the three groups of firms - good return,
medium return and bad return - and the kinds of news they are
experiencing,108 have a second testable implication. This relates to the
number of firms in each return group. While, in each period, the mix
of good news and bad news actually experienced by firms in an
industry (relative to the average) is presumably steady and
symmetrical, a regulatory reform that effectively increases firm
disclosure would temporarily increase as well the number of firms in
the bad-return group. Think of a pipeline that runs from the
experience by a firm of a good or bad event to the event's public
revelation. To the extent disclosure is voluntary, the bad news that is
revealed in any given period will on average have spent more time in
this pipeline than will have the good news revealed in the same period.
In a steady state, we would nonetheless expect to see at any point in
time the same symmetrical distribution of good and bad news being
revealed (and hence of firm returns) that we expect to see in the
distribution of good news and bad news actually experienced by firms
each period, the bad news simply coming on average from an earlier
108. See supra Parts IV.B.1-2.
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point in time than the good news. The reform, if effective, would
temporarily disrupt this steady state, however, and flush out some of
the bad news that, but for the reform, would still have been in the
pipeline and hence unrevealed until later. Thus, returns immediately
after the reform would be asymmetrically distributed, with more firms
having returns below the lower threshold than firms having returns
above the upper threshold. The extra firms in the bad-return group
would come out of the population that would otherwise have been in
the middle-return group.
2.

Testable Hypothesis

This implication suggests a second testable hypothesis with respect
to the effect on share price of the enhanced MD&A requirements:
H2: If the enhanced requirements increase share price
accuracy, the population of firms with below-average
returns should temporarily increase.
3.

The Test of Hypothesis H2

Define N0.80 as the percentage of firms in the bad-return group in
1980 and N0•82 as the percentage of firms in the bad-return group in
1982. The null hypothesis is that N8,80
N8,82 and the alternative
hypothesis H2 is that N8,80 < N8,82• The results of the test are as follows:
=

Null Hypothesis

Alternative
Hypothesis

Test Statistic

-1.860

Probability
Value

(0.03)

Thus we can reject with a high degree of statistical confidence the null
hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis H2 that the
proportion of firms that are in a bad-return group in 1982 is higher
than in 1980. These results tend to confirm that the enhanced MD&A
requirements prompted disclosure of meaningful information. The
longer-term survey, set out in Figure 4, of the proportion of firms in
the bad-return group reinforces this conclusion.
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FIGURE 4

Hypothesis H2
The Proportion of B Firms by Year

64%
62%
60%
58%
56%
54%
52%

1 976 1 977 1 978 1 979 1 980 1 981

1 982 1 983 1 984 1 985 1 986

CONCLUSION

A central feature of debates concerning corporate and securities
law reform across the world - the United States, other developed
economies, and emerging economies alike - concerns the value of
mandatory disclosure. Two big questions occupy much of the
attention. Does the accuracy of equity prices really matter to an
economy and, even if it does, will mandatory disclosure effectively
contribute to share price accuracy? The debate concerning these
questions has been largely at the level of theory. This article attempts
to shed some empirical light on the matter using the new R2
methodology.
Given the dearth of useful empirical study of these questions, the
findings reported here - that share price accuracy appears to enhance
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the efficiency with which capital is allocated and that the management
discussion and analysis disclosure requirements adopted by the SEC in
late 1980 increased share price accuracy - have real importance. At a
minimum, these findings suggest that the enhanced disclosure
requirements under the recently adopted Sarbanes-Oxley Act may
bear real fruit in terms of the better functioning of the underlying
economy. They suggest as well that proposals to eliminate mandatory
disclosure with reforms such as issuer choice of regulatory regime
should be approached with caution.
The work so far, however, is only a beginning. Many further
questions merit investigation. The R2 methodology itself as a proxy for
share price accuracy needs further testing. The relationship between
R2 and other measures of efficiency in the real economy, such as
country growth rates, needs to be explored. There needs to be further
consideration of the question of whether in less developed countries,
disclosure induced improvement in share price accuracy alone would
lead to better economic performance. And, within the United States
and other developed economies, there need to be further tests of other
major disclosure rule changes to see if they too are accompanied by
comparable declines in R2 • The work to date shows the promise in
these exciting future inquiries.
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APPENDIX

TABLE II

j = firm;

w = week;

t = 1980, 1982

rm = market return
ri3 = Three-digit industry return defined as:

��w ; =

- w.1 ,w,t rJ ,W,t )

(

L k El· 3 w;k ,w,t rk ,w,t

·

�3 - 1

W = market value of company j in industry i3
For each group (G, M, B) in each 3 digit industry, calculate:

g = {G, M, BJ
Take logistic transformation:'!'

.

9,13 ,t

=

1n( 1 - : l
R .i3.t
2
Rg,i3,t

[Vol. 102:331
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TABLE III
Summary Results - I

a'P
M

> 0 in

1 02 out of 140 industries. The proportion of a'P
M

significantly greater than 0.5

Relative firm-specific

return variation of G

> 0 is

(p-value = 0. 00)

variable

mean

std

min

max

2
1 -R G,80

0.77 1

0.093

0.427

0.984

2
G,82

0.758

0.096

0.460

0.969

M,80

0.707

0. 1 1 3

0.37 1

0.948

M,82

0.778

0 . 1 02

0.463

0.999

B,80

0.738

0.096

0.424

0.99 1

B,82

0.743

0 . 1 23

0.402

0.997

d 'PG

-0.070

0.708

-2.493

2.056

d1¥M

0.45 1

0.995

- 1 .046

7.690

Ll 1¥s

0. 1 27

1 .0 1 6

-3.527

4.825

firms in 1 980
Relative firm-specific

return variation of G

1 -R

firms in 1 982
Relative firm-specific

2

1 -R

return variation of M
firms in 1 980
Relative firm-specific

2

1 -R

return variation of M
firms in 1 982
Relative firm-specific
return variation of B

2

1 -R

firms in 1 980
Relative firm-specific
return variation of B

2

1 -R

firms in 1 982
Differential log
transformation of
relative firm-specific

return variation of G
firms
Differential log
transformation of

relative firm-specific
return variation of M
firms
Differential log
transformation of
relative firm-specific
return variation of B
firms
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TABLE IV
Null

Alternative

Test

Probability

Hypothesis

HYPothesis

Statistics

Value

d'PG = O

d'PG > O

- 1 . 1 25

(0.87)

d'PM = 0

d'PG > O

5.162

(0.00)

d'Pa = O

d'PG > O

1.429

(0.08)

d'PM = d'Pa

d'Pc > d'Pa

2.257

(0 0 1 )

d'PM = d'PG

d'PM > Ll'Pa

5.149

(0.00)

.

TABLE V
Control Variables - Variables that Affect the R2 Estimates
Industry Diversification

DJ ,ie,t
.

=

.

L k�j,i 3 A k ,r Sk ,r
L klfi,i 3 A kt

11 D

) ,I
·

·

3

=

D · · 3 1 9 s2
] ,I ,

-

D · 3 1 9so
] ,I ,
·

Industry Size
sj,i 3 ,t

=

L k,,; ; 3 ln(;r, Ak 1 )
'

,,
_

nj,i 3,1

. ·3
!18 j,l

=

sj., l"3 ' 1 982

-

s j,l
. ·3 ' 1 980

Industry Structure
/j., l 3 ,I
.

=

3
ft j,i3,t
V�

ni.i.l.1

=

· ·3
Mj,l

=

· ·3 ' 1982
Ij,l

-

· ·3' 1980
Ij,l

number offirms in group j in industry i3 in year t
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TABLE VI
Multivariate Regressions
Run
�'I') , I 3
.

.

= a+

do

+

ds

=

" Yk
· ·3 , k
L..,,, Z ),I
K

+ e),I
· ·3

where:
j = {G, M, G},
d0 and d8 are dummies indicating the above and below middle
retum group,
Zk are control variables
Test de < O; d8 < 0
Table VII
Simple Correlations
ilS

ill

-0.368

0.067

(0.00)

(0. 1 9)
-0.1 77

Differential log
transformation ofrelative
firm-specific variation
ilS

Differential size

LlI

Differential industry
structure

(0.00)
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TABLE VIII
Regression Results

Specification

5. 1

Dependent variable

Log transformation ofrelativefirmse.ecific return variation,� 'I'
dc;

Goodfirms

5.2

5.3

-0.521

-0.416

-0.429

(0.00)

(0.00)
-0. 1 36

(0.00)
-0. 1 49

(0.01)

(0.30)
-.024 1
(0.00)
-.0541

(0.30)
-0.243
(0.00)
-0.065)

(0.22)

(0.20)

no

yes

industry dummy
Badfirms
industry dummy

ds

Differential size

8S

Differential
industry
structure

81

No

Three-digit
industry
dummies
F-statistic
Regression R

-0.323

2

Number of industries

1 0.670

1 8.780

1 5.1 1 0

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.03)

0.052

0 . 1 63

0.371
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